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CASENOTES

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW-Blockbusting Provision of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 Is Constitutional-Standing of the Attorney
General Clarified. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.,
474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).

Blockbusting has been recognized as a fundamental element in the perpetuation of segregated neighborhoods. 1 The practice is exploited by unscrupulous realtors who stimulate and prey upon racial bigotry and fear
by initiating and encouraging rumors that blacks are about to move into
a given area, that all whites will leave, that the market value of properties
will descend drastically, and that residence in the area will become unsafe
for non-blacks. 2 In United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.,s the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was presented with the first challenge to the
constitutionality of section 3604(e), the anti-blockbusting provision of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968. 4 The action was brought by the Department of
Justice pursuant to section 3613,5 and the complaint alleged that appellant
1. Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
2. Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Ill.
1969). For a description of particular tactics see United States v. Mintzes, 304 F.
Supp. 1305, 1310-11 (D. Md. 1969). See generally Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J.
170 (1970); Blockbusting: A Novel Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Serious
Problem, 7 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROBS. 538 (1971).
3. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970). The relevant subsection provides:
§ 3604. Discriminationin the sale or rental of housing.
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by
sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawfulFor profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent
(e)
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into
the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion,
or national origin.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any
person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to
the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any
group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter
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and four other Atlanta, Georgia, real estate brokers had engaged in blockbusting activities in a racially transitional area of southeast Atlanta. The
government alleged specifically that the defendants participated, individually and collectively, in a pattern or practice of resistance to the enjoyment
of rights granted by the Act, and that a group of persons had been denied
rights secured by the Act, raising an issue of general public importance.6
On appeal, appellant Bob Lawrence Realty argued principally that section
3604(e) was unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress lacked the authority to pass it, that it violated the first amendment guarantee of freedom
of speech, and that the U.S. Attorney General did not have standing to
bring the action. 7 Rejecting appellant's arguments in toto, the court affirmed
the injunction entered by the district court.
Constitutionalityof Section 3604(e)
In addressing the question of constitutionality, the court, Judge Goldberg writing, was guided by several earlier cases. The first of these was Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.," where the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of section 1982, 9 construing that statute to prohibit all racial discrimination, both public and private, in the sale and rental of property. Section 1982 is, according to the Court, a "valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment."' 10
The Jones decision opened a new chapter in the history of the thirteenth
amendment,"1 which many civil rights authorities had considered to be of
and such denial raises an issue of general public importance, he may bring a
civil action . . . requesting such preventive relief . . . as he deems necessary.
6. 474 F.2d at 117.

7. After the original complaint was filed, the district court denied several motions
filed by the defendants. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp.
870 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

Following this, appellant and two other defendants filed sep-

arate motions for summary judgment, which were denied. The Court did find that the
government's evidence was insufficient to make out an individual pattern or practice of
violations by appellant. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 487
(N.D. Ga. 1971). At trial the district court enjoined appellant and one remaining
defendant from further violations of section 3604(e). United States v. Mitchell,
335 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Only Bob Lawrence Realty appealed.
8. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
10. 392 U.S. at 413.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
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little use since the early part of the twentieth century. 12 The decision affirmed the power of Congress under the enabling clause of the amendment to
"determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation."' 13 The
Jones Court drew its authority, and a proliferation of key phrases ("badges
of slavery" or "relics of slavery," protection of "freedom" and "fundamental
rights"), from the Civil Rights Cases,14 decided just after the amendment
was ratified. At that time, Mr. Justice Bradley reasoned that "legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and
circumstances to be affected by [the thirteenth amendment], and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit."' 15 However, the opinion construed the "badges and incidents of slavery" quite narrowly, and held the amendment not to be applicable to mere social rights.
Curiously, Justice Bradley had earlier provided a much broader interpretation of the amendment, in dictum, while sitting on circuit in United
States v. Cruikshank.16 Congress, he said, had the power to eliminate
"badges of servitude" and give "full effect to this bestowment of liberty on
these millions of people.' 17
The expansive tendencies explicit in Cruikshank and implicit in the Civil Rights Cases were abruptly halted in Hodges v. United States,' 8 which
held specifically that Congress could not legislate under the thirteenth
amendment to protect private employment contracts. The definition of
slavery and its incidents remained severely limited, and the power of Congress under the amendment was strictly construed until Jones; since Jones,
however, the early history of the thirteenth amendment has lost almost all
significance. 19
12. See generally Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis,
82 HA v.L.REV. 1294 (1969).
13. 392 U.S. at 440.
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
15. Id., at 20.
16. 25 F. Cas. 707 (No. 14,897) (C.C. La. 1874), afl'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which narrowed the Civil Rights
Cases holding. In United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903), which involved a conspiracy to prevent blacks from leasing and cultivating land, the federal
court chose to ignore Plessy, and followed the expansive interpretation of Cruikshank,
providing what is perhaps the closest precedent for Jones.
17. 25 F. Cas. at 711.
18. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
19. For an excellent analysis of the "old" thirteenth amendment, see tenBroek,
Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Consummation to
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951). Professor tenBroek writes that the proponents of the amendment envisioned broad changes
depending upon an analysis which not only abolished slavery, but guaranteed the provision of life, liberty and property, all protected by the government-a federalism
revolution according to Lockean principles.
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Following Jones by little more than a year, Brown v. State Realty Co. 20
was the first constitutional test of section 3604(e) on the federal district
court level. Plaintiffs as private citizens brought an action for injunctive relief and damages against defendants who had allegedly violated section
21
3604(e) while soliciting real estate listings in plaintiffs' neighborhood.
In countering defendants' constitutional attack on section 3604(e), the
court rejected use of the commerce clause as the basis of congressional
authority for the statute citing Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United

States22 and Katzenbach v. McClung,23 and noting: "There is no evidence that the activities proscribed herein are in interstate commerce ....
Thus, any claim of jurisdiction on such grounds must fail."'24 The court
also rejected section 5 (the enabling clause) of the fourteenth amendment as the basis for federal jurisdiction, citing as authority United States v.
Guest,25 for absence of the requisite state action. However, the district
court did find justification for section 3604(e) in the thirteenth amendment, as construed in Jones, offering that the Supreme Court opinion "seems
to constitute a pre-approval of the Fair Housing Title . . . of which the
'blockbusting' provision is a part."' 26 There remained for the court to consider whether the provision was itself a rational means of effectuating the
stated policy of the Act, the burden being upon defendants to show otherwise. 27 Since no such showing was made, the court denied a motion to dis20. 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
21. As provided in 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970), private citizens may bring civil suits
to enforce the rights granted by sections 3603, 3604, 3605 and 3606 without regard
to the amount in controversy. Paragraph (c) of the section allows relief to be
granted for actual damages and not more than $1000 punitive damages plus court
costs and attorney's fees as appropriate, in addition to providing for injunctions and
restraining orders.
22. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Owner of a motel which solicited and received patronage
from interstate travelers brought suit to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing the
public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against him. The
Court stated that the test of the exercise of power under the commerce clause is
simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is commerce which concerns more
than one state and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest.
The Court included within the power of Congress to
23. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
regulate under the commerce clause those intrastate activities which so affect interstate
commerce as to make congressional regulation of them appropriate.
24. 304 F. Supp. at 1239.
Plaintiffs in Brown contended that section 5 of the
25. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
fourteenth amendment was no longer limited to classic state action in the historical
sense of the amendment, but that the provision gives Congress unlimited authority to
enact legislation restricting individuals from activity which might affect a state's ability
to perform fourteenth amendment obligations. This was the thrust of Justice Brennan's dissent in Guest, 383 U.S. at 774-86. The majority held otherwise, requiring
classic state action.
26. 304 F. Supp. at 1240.
27. Id., citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (power under commerce clause); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (power under the four-
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further violations of section

3604(e).
The same approach was adopted without hesitation in United States v.
Mintzes,2s which was the first case brought by the U.S. Attorney General
under section 3613 to enforce the provisions of section 3604(e). The federal district court in Maryland agreed with Brown that the constitutionality of
section 3604(e) could not be justified by either the commerce clause or the
fourteenth amendment, and rested its argument squarely on Jones, while eschewing any detailed thirteenth amendment analysis. Citing Brown, the
court also concluded that section 3604(e) is a ". . . rational and not unreasonable means of effectuating the stated policy of the legislation 'to provide,
within constitutional limitations for fair housing throughout the United
States.' "29
The significance of Brown and Mintzes is that while each decision was
based upon the authority of the Jones holding, neither opinion sought to bring
the fact situations peculiar to blockbusting cases precisely within the field of
the analysis which supports Jones. Rather, each sought to justify its decision with the broad federal policy articulated by Mr. Justice Stewart in
Jones. Justice Stewart was careful, however, to distinguish between section
1982 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 3 0 leaving no doubt that
the discrimination prohibited by the 1866 Act was specifically racial.
Blockbusting, on the other hand, normally involves white realtors exploiting the fear and ignorance of white homeowners-the link here with slavery,
and thus with the thirteenth amendment, is much more tenuous. Yet, when
blockbusting is successful, and the fleeing whites do sell at "panic" prices,
it does not necessarily mean that the blacks who are then induced to buy
the properties will do so at bargain prices, or even fair prices. 3 1 The
policy of Jones, that the thirteenth amendment guarantees that a dollar in the
hand of a black will buy as much as a dollar in the hand of a white, does seem
to leave lower courts the option to apply that policy and its constitutional
underpinning to blockbusting cases, the caveat of Justice Stewart notwithstanding.
Having taken this option, Lawrence Realty did not significantly improve
upon the thirteenth amendment arguments of either Brown or Mintzes.
teenth amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)

(power under

the fifteenth amendment).
28. 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
29. Id., at 1313.
30. 392 U.S. at 413-15.
31.

See Note, Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial Unconscionability, and Sec-

tion 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case, 80 YALE L.J. 516 (1971).
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Judge Goldberg did not consider either the commerce clause or the fourteenth amendment, but found the mandate of Jones clear and compelling,
and denied that appellant could have made an effective argument against
the rationality of the statute. However, the court was also called upon in
Lawrence Realty to consider appellant's contention that section 3604(e)
was an unconstitutional prior restraint on the right of free speech.
In neither of the previous section 3604(e) cases was there a direct first
amendment attack on the statute. Judge Thomsen, who wrote the opinion in
Mintzes, did consider the problem briefly in dictum. 3 2 He argued that Congress added the phrase "for profit" specifically to avoid charges that the
statute restrained protected speech, the implication being that statements
made within a commercial context do not enjoy the same protection as other
forms of speech. In another opinion, United States v. Hunter,33 the court
held that section 3604(c) 34 does not violate the First Amendment:
It is now well settled that, while 'freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion' enjoys the fullest protection
of the First Amendment, 'the Constitution imposes no such restraint
on government as respects purely commercial advertising.'
Val35
entine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54.

.

. (1942).

Earlier authorities for the general proposition that the first amendment
does not protect at least some commercial statements are Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States36 and Associated Press v. United States.3 7 In Lorain Journal,

the Supreme Court upheld an injunction which prevented the publisher from
accepting or rejecting commercial advertisements of others in violation of the
antitrust laws. In Associated Press, the Court sustained an injunction against
the company's exclusive news arrangement with a Canadian company, also
in violation of the Sherman Act.
In all three cases, Hunter, Lorain Journal and Associated Press,
the argu-

ment can conceivably be made that what was enjoined was not so much speech
as it was commercial activity. That was precisely the major argument ad32. 304 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
33. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972). This case
was relied upon heavily by the court in Lawrence Realty.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). The section reads in relevant part:
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by
sections 3603 (b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful(c) to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published,
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
35. 459 F.2d at 211.
36. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
37. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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vanced by the district court in Lawrence Realty.88 Furthermore, Judge
Goldberg said, "Section 3604(e) regulates commercial activity, not speech,"'39
and described the representations of Bob Lawrence Realty as just such activity. Even granted that such activity has some informational value, he argued, such value to the prospective seller (or, for that matter, to the realtor)
is greatly outweighed by the express congressional interest contained in
40
section 3604(e) in preventing blockbusting.
The district court had stated more bluntly that "[t]he statute is one regulating conduct, and . . . any inhibiting effect it may have upon speech is
41
justified by the Government's interest in protecting its citizens ....
Again, as in the thirteenth amendment arguments, the court in Lawrence
Realty did not seek to break new legal ground in its first amendment argument, but rather sought to justify section 3604(e) by demonstrating more
traditional bases for the statute.

Standing of the Attorney General
According to section 3613, the Attorney General has standing to sue
whenever there is an "individual" or a "group" pattern or practice which
resists the enjoyment of rights granted by the Fair Housing Act, or whenever
a group of persons has been denied such rights and such denial raises an
issue of general public importance. 42 To date, the phrase "pattern or practice" seems to have raised the most problems for the courts.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first considered the phrase in
United States v. Mayton,43 a voter registration case which involved alleged
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1960. 44 The court in declaring that
' '4 5
"... the words pattern or practice were not intended to be words of art,
took its cue from former Deputy Attorney General Walsh who said before the
House Judiciary Committee: "Pattern or practice have their generic meanings. In other words, the court finds that the discrimination was not an isolated or accidental or peculiar event .... ,,46 This guideline was followed
by the Mintzes Court, which determined that three violations of section
3604(e) were sufficient to establish a pattern or practice.
38. 313 F. Supp. at 872.
39. 474 F.2d at 121.
40. On the point of overriding governmental interest, see United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968), where Chief Justice Warren determined that O'Brien's
act of burning his Selective Service registration card was not a form of normally protected speech, but was essentially an unprotected act whose ancillary speech aspects
were less compelling than the government's interest.
41. 313 F. Supp. at 872.
42. See note 5 supra.
43. 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964).
44. Specifically, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (1970).
45. 335 F.2d at 158.
46. Hearings on H.R. 10327 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,

2d Sess. ser. 15, at 13 (1960).
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A similar approach was taken by the court in United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corporation,47 where the court reasoned that, with regard to the
phrase "pattern or practice," "[n]o mathematical formula is workable,
nor was any intended. '48
The federal district court in Lawrence Realty found that appellant had not
engaged in an individual pattern or practice, but that the evidence clearly
established a group pattern of violations of which appellant had been a
part. On appeal, Bob Lawrence argued that the Attorney General must prove
that appellant had participated in an individual pattern or practice in order
to have standing to obtain relief for a group pattern or practice, and that the
Attorney General must allege and prove conspiracy or concerted activity in order to have standing to obtain injunctive relief against a group pattern or
practice of violations.
Following the "clear meaning" of section 3613 and the standard of usage
established in the earlier cases, Judge Goldberg found appellant's contentions
erroneous. He argued that deference to the desire of Congress to prevent
blockbusting required a simple definition of when the Attorney General would
have standing to bring a suit under section 3613. It followed that the Attorney General's determination (supported by the findings of the district
court) that he had reasonable cause to believe that violations Were taking
place established his standing. 49 The court went so far as to indicate that it
is the Attorney General's prerogative alone to decide when an issue of general public importance, as defined by the Act, has been raised. 50 This
reasoning may perhaps establish a standard for future cases brought to
enforce section 3604(e), thus obviating the necessity for the Attorney General to present evidence in pretrial hearings just to establish that an issue of
general public importance exists.
Conclusion
One danger created by Brown and Mintzes, and preserved by Lawrence
Realty is that of placing all one's eggs in one thirteenth amendment basket.
While the mandate of Jones may be clear, the guidelines offered may not
always be appropriate in blockbusting cases. Jones dealt with a purely
racial problem, while a good percentage of cases brought to enforce section
3604(e) will most likely be initiated by white homeowners. Grounding
the congressional authority of the statute in the thirteenth amendment alone,
47.
48.
49.
50.

437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id., at 227.
See United States v. Iron Workers Local No. 1, 438 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1971).
474 F.2d at 125.
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at least as it was construed by Jones, may well lead some courts to demand
that plaintiffs prove definitie racial discrimination.
Indeed, Jones warned that not all unfair housing problems might be solved
with the thirteenth amendment, and hinted that the commerce clause or the
fourteenth amendment might be appropriate in some cases. 5 ' Both of these
alternatives were rejected in Brown and Mintzes and were not even considered in Lawrence Realty. Seeking to bottom its decision on the "new"
thirteenth amendment, the court in Lawrence Realty appears to have overlooked a fundamental difference between the facts it reviewed and those
presented in Jones. Plaintiff in Jones relied upon section 1982, an early statute which is in no way a comprehensive open housing law, and which would
be useless against blockbusting, especially in the incipient stages which involve whites only. Furthermore, Joseph Lee Jones was a black man, and the
opportunity to inject new life into the thirteenth amendment by way of section 1982 was quickly seized by the Supreme Court. In contrast, the 1968
Fair Housing Act is a comprehensive open housing statute, and the blockbusting provision was designed to halt the practice even in its incipient
stages. There was no compelling need in Lawrence Realty to justify section
3604(e) only with the thirteenth amendment. The opportunity existed to
bring into play a complete arsenal of federal authority, and the court ignored it.
To use the fourteenth amendment in a case similar to Lawrence Realty
would require avoiding the state action requirement, which, in light of United
States v. Guest, does not seem possible at present. The commerce clause is
a much more hopeful alternative. Katzenbach v. McClung demonstrated
that actual interstate commerce need not be demonstrated in order to justify congressional regulation. 52 Surely a case can be made that the results of
blockbusting, e.g., the perpetuation of segregated neighborhoods, rapidly
changing neighborhoods, or the movement of people across state borders,
do have some measurable effect upon interstate commerce.
Nor did Lawrence Realty completely answer the first amendment attack
on section 3604(e). It has not been fully established that speech entirely
within a commercial context is less deserving of protection than other forms
of discourse. The cases draw support for the contention that commercial
statements are subject to Jamison v. Texas limitations. 55 That decision has
51. 392 U.S. at 417. Justice Stewart described the Fair Housing Act of 1968 as,
"a detailed housing law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and
enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority."
52. See note 23 supra. See generally, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
53. 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943). The Court said: "The states can prohibit the use
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come under recent attack in Ginzburg v. United States,54 an obscenity case
in which the Supreme Court said that "commercial activity, in itself, is no
justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First
Amendment. '5 5 The contention, admittedly advanced in Lawrence Realty,
that section 3604(e) violations are activities rather than pure speech
seems to be the most logical way out of this quandary. Finally, it must be
said that while the blockbusting provision appears to have withstood its
first appellate challenge, the Lawrence Realty opinion merely finessed the
subtle problems presented. A firm resolution must await some future case.
Richard D. Vergas

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Membership Preferences in a Recreational Facility Where There Is a Transfer of These Rights as
an Incident to a Real Property Transaction Are Covered Under
42 U.S.C. § 1982-A Club Is Not Characterized as Private,
When It Is Open to Every White Person within a Geographic
Area, Race Being the Sole Criterion for Membership-Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., 410 U.S. 431

(1973).

The Civil Rights Act of 1866,1 now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,
lay dormant for nearly one hundred years before coming to the attention of
civil rights advocates as a means of redressing private acts of discrimination.
In an innovative reading of section 1982 the Supreme Court construed the
section's provisions to ban private discrimination in housing. 2 The resurrection of this previously dormant section protecting an individual's right
to buy and sell property without regard to his race was seen as a broad juof the streets for the distribution of purely commercial leaflets, even though such

leaflets may have 'a civic appeal, or a moral platitude' appended." Jamison in turn
relied upon Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), where the Court was "clear
that the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." 316 U.S. at 54.
54. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
55. Id. at 474.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970), formerly § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
2. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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dicial innovation but has consequently created problems in the application
of the section's provisions. Dispute over the scope and coverage of section 19823 has been intensified in light of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act4 in which federal protection was given to certain rights also within the
ambit of Section 1982. Although the boundaries of the 1866 Act remain
unclear, the Court by its unanimous decision in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Association, Inc.5 affirmed the use of section 1982 as an effective weapon for fighting the inequities of private racial discrimination.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, a non-profit corporation, was organized for the purpose of operating a swimming pool for its members and
their guests. Under Wheaton-Haven's by-laws, persons residing within a
three-quarter mile radius of the pool received special membership preferences. 6 Persons living outside this area could only constitute thirty per-cent
of the association's total membership. Dr. and Mrs. Harry Press, black
homeowners living within the three-quarter mile radius, attempted to obtain an application for membership, but their request was refused, on the
basis of their race. The Presses and three other plaintiffs 7 brought suit in
a federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
monetary damages. They contended that membership in Weaton-Haven constituted a type of personal property or a form of leasehold interest in real
property s the ownership of which could not be denied them on racial
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).

§§ 2000a to 200a-6 (1970).
5. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
6. Residents living within the prescribed geographic area, needed no endorsement
for membership from a current member; residents received priority if the membership
was full over all persons except those who had first options; and a resident member
who was a homeowner and who sold his home and resigned his membership conferred
on his purchasers a first option to acquire membership, subject to the approval of the
board of directors. 410 U.S. at 433.
7. Mr. and Mrs. Murray Tillman, the white plaintiffs, were the members of
Wheaton-Haven who invited a black guest, Mrs. Grace Rosner, to the pool. She was
admitted on her first visit but subsequently was denied admission pursuant to a new
rule limiting guests to relatives of members. Mrs. Rosner was the fifth plaintiff.
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211, 1213 (4th Cir. 1971).
8. Plaintiffs further argued "admission to membership is said to be a contract between the association and the member," 451 F.2d at 1213-14, and that a denial of this
contract right would violate section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified as
42 U.S.C. § 1981 which reads in relevant part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every state and Territority to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens.
Several cases have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 involving the protection of contract
rights reaches private acts of discrimination. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968); accord, Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d
757 (3d Cir. 1971). But see Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ala.
1971). The fourth circuit in Tillman, however, did not consider this argument, con4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 et seq., 42 U.S.C.
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grounds by virtue of section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.9 In addition, plaintiff's claimed that Wheaton-Haven qualified as an entertainment establishment within the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and therefore,
the association's discriminatory membership policies did not fall within
the private exemption provisions of the 1964 Act.10 The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this decision," one
judge dissenting, and held that Wheaton-Haven was exempt from the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it was a private club.
It further found that actions brought under the 1866 Act were subject by
implication to the private club exemption contained in the 1964 Act. 1 2 On
certiorari the United States Supreme Court held that Wheaton-Haven's racially
discriminatory membership policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and that
Wheaton-Haven was not a private club within the meaning of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, since there was "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness . . . other

than race.'

13

The Supreme Court rejected the repeal by implication theory utilized by
the Court of Appeals.' 4 Rather, in reaching its decision the Court focused
on the issue of whether membership in a community recreation facility, incident to the ownership or rental of real property, constituted protected
section 1982 property, the use of which could not be restricted solely on the
basis of race. This article will concern itself with the nature of section 1982
property in relation to the private club exemption contained in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Legislative History

Originally enacted as section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,11 to
cluding that sections 1981 and 1982 were not available to the plaintiffs. 451 F.2d at
1216 n.ll.
9. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 114 § 16, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)
provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), discussed in part II of this article.
11. 451 F.2d at 1211.
12. Id. at 1214.
13.

410 U.S. at 438.

14. As a consequence of this finding, the Court remanded the case to the district
court "so that plaintiff's claims could be evaluated "free of the misconception that
Wheaton-Haven is exempt from sections 1981, 1982, and 2000a." Id. at 439.
15. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. This Act was passed over
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implement the newly ratified thirteenth amendment, the ambiguous language
of section 1982, coupled with its unclear legislative history' 6 greatly hindered its effectiveness as a civil rights statute. As a result, early Supreme
Court cases narrowly interpreted the thirteenth amendment and restricted
the amendment's use to situations involving state action. Thus the power
of Congress to prohibit private acts of discrimination under section 1982 was
limited. 17 Moreover, legal precedent' intimated that the fourteenth amendment with its requirement of state action provided at least in part the constitutional authority upon which section 1982 was based.
Not until' 9 the decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 20 did the Supreme Court answer the question of whether the 1866 Act was intended to
reach private as well as public acts of discrimination. Mr. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority in Jones, analyzed the 1866 Act in light of "its
plain and unambiguous language" and its legislative history, and found that
Congress had the power under section two of the thirteenth amendment to
prohibit those private acts of racial discrimination that it considered to be
"badges and incidents of slavery." Specifically, the Court found that denying non-whites the right to purchase, lease, sell or own property constituted
2
such a badge or incident. '
As interpreted in Jones, a company's refusal to sell a home to an individthe veto of President Andrew Johnson. Fearing that the Act was unconstitutional
under the thirteenth amendment, Congress re-enacted the 1866 Act in § 18 of the
1870 Enforcement Act, which was based on the fourteenth amendment. Enforcement

Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982).

16. See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT.
89 (1968).
17. In Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the Court declared that the
thirteenth amendment did not protect individual rights which were not connected with
slavery. The Supreme Court in Jones v. Mayer, overruled Hodges. 392 U.S. at 441-43
n,78. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883), where the Court stated that
"it would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every
act of discrimination .... "
18. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) where the Court interpreted the 1866 Act
to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment thus necessitating the requisite
finding of state action; accord, Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926);
see also, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879).
19. The only application of section 1982 prior to Jones was in Hurd v. Hodge,
supra note 18 where the Court upheld a racially restrictive covenant but stated that
section 1982 prohibited its enforcement in federal courts. This was the closest case on
the facts to Jones, however, it did not present a private discrimination question.
20. This case has been the subject of extensive scholarly examination. See, e.g.,
Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 63, 82 (1968); Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight of Negro Freedom Revisited:
Some First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 537
(1968); Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal AntiDiscriminationLaws, 69 COLUM. 1019 (1969).
21. 392 U.S. at 440-41.
REV.
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ual because of his race violated a property right that Congress had expressly
covered under section 1982. Property rights protected by section 1982
were lated expanded in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc. 2 2 to include
membership in a recreational facility where such membership was incidental
to the acquisition of a leasehold. The Sullivan Court followed its previous
decision in Jones and found that section 1982 was valid thirteeenth amendment legislation and, in addition, extended Jones by awarding damages for the violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Moreover, the Sullivan decision added to the list of badges and incidents of slavery the fundamental right to lease property and decided that interference with such a
right by a third party provided a private right of action under section
1982.23
Considered together, Jones and Sullivan established a "common law of
forbidden racial discriminations ' 24 under section 1982 even though the precise boundaries of the section remained unclear. The Court's failure to establish the parameters of the 1866 Act was subsequently reflected in the
fourth circuit's approach in Tillman.
I.

Defining a PropertyInterest Incident to a Real Estate
Transaction: Fourth Circuit Approach

The fourth circuit took great pains to distinguish the factual situation presented in Tillman from that in the Sullivan case, despite apparent similarity. In Sullivan, plaintiff owned two membership shares 25 in Little Hunting
Park, one of which he assigned to T.E. Freeman as a concomitant part of a
lease agreement between Freeman and the plaintiff. After the Board of Directors refused to approve plaintiff's assignment because Freeman was black,
suit was initiated to secure injunctive relief and damages under section
1982.26 The Court found that the board's refusal to approve the membership assignment was a violation of Freeman's right to lease a right which
included the assignment of membership rights in facilities incidental to the
27
rental of real property.
In Tillman, plaintiffs claimed a parallel connection between a real es22. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
23. Id. at 237.
24. 396 U.S. at 247 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. In Wheaton-Haven, each family could have only one membership share since
membership was by family units. Thus membership was not transferable unless the
first option provision was considered a transfer of membership rights incident to a
sale of property.
26. 396 U.S. at 234, 235.
27. Id. at 236-37. This interpretation was reenforced by the fact that Freedman
paid part of his rent for the privilege of using the club facilities,
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tate transaction and club membership. Although membership could not
be assigned or leased as in Sullivan,2s under the Wheaton-Haven by-laws
once a member sold his residence and resigned his membership, his purchaser was entitled to a first option to become a member. Plaintiffs argued
that the first option allowed by the Wheaton-Haven association achieved the
same result as the outright transfer of membership permitted by Little Hunt29
ing Park Recreation Association.
In reaching its conclusion that section 1982 was unavailable to plaintiffs
as support for a cause of action, the fourth circuit emphasized certain factors: first, membership in Wheaton-Haven was not for sale or lease to the
public and that unlike the membership involved in Sullivan, membership in
Wheaton-Haven was not incident to the purchase of a home from a member;80
and second, purchase of a home within the geographically delimited area did not
impliedly carry with it the right to membership in the association 3 ' but gave
the new owner only a first option to be considered for membership before
other persons, if a waiting list existed. Since the club membership had
never been full,3 2 the court reasoned that the first option was not the equivalent of a transfer of membership because all prospective members,
with or without an option, could have an application for membership con33
sidered immediately.
As discussed in Judge Butzner's dissent in Tillman,3 4 the majority failed
to consider the economic importance of the first option if membership rolls
became full in the future. In such a case, a white owner would be able to
sell his home at a higher price than a black resident because the former could
convey an option for membership in Wheaton-Haven. Furthermore,
membership priorities aimed at persons residing within the three-quarter
mile radius of the pool, coupled with the pool's restrictive membership
policy, would discourage blacks from buying into that community and would
28. See note 25 supra.
29. 451 F.2d at 1217.
30. Id. The previous owner of the home, which the black plaintiffs in Tillman purchased, had not been a member of Wheaton-Haven. Therefore, Dr. Press sought an

application for membership without the benefit of a first option.
31. The fourth circuit found that the radius requirement in Wheaton-Haven was
merely an area preference and concluded that there was no connection between membership and ownership of land as was the case in Sullivan. 451 F.2d at 1219.

32. The fourth circuit relied on defendant's assertion at oral argument that membership in Wheaton-Haven, limited to 325 families, had been held at 260 families for
several years. 451 F.2d at 1213 n.1. This assertion was later corrected to reflect a full
membership list in 1968. The court of appeals was not influenced by this factor and
denied a rehearing en banc over two dissents. Id. at 1225 (Winter, Craven, JJ., dissenting).
33. 451 F.2d at 1217.
34. Id. at 1222 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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diminish the value of their purchase in contradiction to the dictates of section 1982.3 5
Thus, the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of reconciling
the fourth circuit's approach to section 1982 in Tillman with its own earlier
interpretation in Jones and Sullivan. Significantly, resolution of this issue
depended on whether the Court conceived Tillman to be factually distinguishable from Sullivan. Recognizing the similarities in the nature of the
property right manifested in the two cases, the Court found that the fourth
circuit had erred in failing to follow the holding in Sullivan.86 The Court
reasoned that section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed all
citizens "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to . . .

purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property. 8' 7 Implicit
in this guarantee is the right to the same use and enjoyment of property as a
white citizen would receive. Specifically, this includes access to recreational facilities available to all residents in a particular community as an
incident of their ownershhip or rental of real property. Furthermore,
the Court rejected the notion that the first option was not to be considered an
incident to any sale of property by virtue of the membership rolls having
never been full. 8 . In light of the membership priority given to persons
buying homes from Wheaton-Haven members, and the priority given generally to persons residing within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool,
the Court concluded that Wheaton-Haven's discriminatory practices abridged
89
and diluted the black plaintiff's right to these membership benefits.
II.

The Effect of the PrivateClub Exemption on the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: Repeal by Implication

Although minor factual differences distinguished Tillman from Sullivan, the
fourth circuit and the Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions as to the
availability of section 1982 as a basis for relief. The divergence of the
different approaches taken by the courts can be seen in the opinion of Judge
Haynsworth, writing for the majority, who found that the private club exemption embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 196440 operated to limit any
35. The Court stated in Jones v. Mayer, that the thirteenth amendment "would be
left with "a mere paper guarantee" if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in
the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white
man." 392 U.S. at 443.
36. 410 U.S. at 435-36.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
38. 410 U.S. at 437.
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970) states: "The provisions of this subchapter shall
not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public , . "
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inconsistent provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. While admitting
that repeal by implication 41 was not favored, Judge Haynsworth reasoned
that since the 1964 Act expressly protected conduct made unlawful by
the earlier statute, 42 and since the 1964 Act was the most recent expression of congressional intent in this area, the 1964 Act should be controlling.
After deciding that the subject matter coverage of the 1866 Act was by
necessity restricted by the private club exemption of the 1964 Act, Judge
Haynsworth then considered whether Wheaton-Haven qualified as a private
club.43 The Court in Sullivan faced an analogous situation in which the
coverage of the 1866 Act and the 1964 Act seemed to converge. 44 The Court
did not focus on whether the private club exemption operated to make the
1866 Act inapplicable but, rather, determined that the club in Sullivan was
not private and then considered whether membership in the club constituted
section 1982 property. 45 Ignoring this compelling precedent, Judge Haynsworth sought to distinguish between the organizational structure in WheatonHaven from that found in Little Hunting Park to reach his conclusion that
Wheaton-Haven qualified as a bona fide private club. What constitutes
a private club has never been defined with specificity. Particularly, determining whether a club is private, hinges on its membership and admission policies. In assessing Wheaton-Haven's claim for private club consideration,
Judge Haynsworth found that Wheaton-Haven met the traditional test of
privacy. 46 The most important factor 47 influencing this conclusion was
41. 451 F.2d at 1214 n.5. In dealing with this question, the courts have consistently declined to interpret subsequent civil rights legislation as impairing the remedies
provided under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See, e.g., Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. at
413-17 (Fair Housing Title of Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not impair the sanction
of section 1982); accord, Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co.,
438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not impose
jurisdictional barriers to suits under the 1866 Act (1); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970) (specific remedies of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act do not preempt general remedial language of section 1981 of the 1866
Act).
42. Judge Haynsworth based this conclusion on his interpretation of the legislative
history surrounding the enactment of the 1964 Act. 451 F.2d at 1214 n.5.
43. The 1964 Civil Rights Act contains no standards for determining whether a
club is private. Consequently, courts have developed qualifications on a case by case
basis. U.S. v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969). One indistinguishable factor
is that an organization must have some definite qualifications for selecting members.
See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Wright v. The Cork Club,
315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151-53 (S.D. Tex. 1970). Another factor considered is advertising,
since a club could hardly be deemed private if it utilized advertising to attract members.
Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
44. In both cases, the Court was considering membership benefits in a club obtained
as an incident of a sale of real property.
45. 396 U.S. at 236-37.
46. In determining whether a club is private, the courts examine an association's

membership policies. Offering to serve all the white persons in a geographic area is

1973]

Casenotes

Judge Haynsworth's finding that the association had established criteria
4s
other than race for the selection of members.
Wheaton-Haven's claim for private club status appears suspect in view of
the fact that the only real membership standard expressed in the association's by-laws is that the applicant must reside within a stated geographic
area. Every individual owning or leasing a home within the prescribed
area is eligible to become a member without meeting any other standards. 49 Membership which was based essentially on the geography of residence and which was readily transferable by an area homeowner through
use of a first option at the time of a home sale is the very antithesis of
a private club. Moreover, the use of the first option underscores the lack of
exclusivity in Wheaton-Haven since the sole criterion for determining membership in those circumstances turned on the purchaser's identity.
Under Sullivan, the test for determining what characterizes a club as
private is whether there is a "plan or purpose of exclusiveness" with respect
to membership. 50 Utilizing this test, the Court concluded that the structure
and practices of Wheaton-Haven were indistinguishable from those of Little Hunting Park, since membership in both organizations "[was] open to
every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective
element other than race." 51 Finding that Wheaton-Haven was not a private
club, the Court stated that it was unnecessary "to consider the issue of any
implied limitation on the sweep of section 1982 when its application to a
truly private club, within the meaning of § 2000a(e) is under consideration."'5 2 By abdicating its responsibility to resolve the apparent conflict
between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
it is clear that confusion between the scope and coverage of the two statutes
said to be inconsistent with the nature of a private club. Genuine selectivity on some
reasonable basis is important. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.
1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc., 396 U.S. 236 (1969); Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969) (recreational facility issuing season memberships to white adults
living in the community). See also, Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967)
(where only selective element is race, the club will not be deemed private). Accord,
U.S. v. Jack Sabins Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967).
47. See note 48 infra.
48. Even though the fourth circuit was unable to find "easily ascertainable standards for membership other than . . . an interest in swimming", it found that there were
other selective criteria than race alone. 451 F.2d at 1221. Bolstering this conclusion
was the fact that one white applicant had been rejected. It should be noted, however,
that in Sullivan, one applicant for membership had also been rejected. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
49. 451 F.2d at 1223 (Butzner, J. dissenting).
50. 396 U.S. at 236.
51. 410 U.S. at 438.
52. Id. at 438-39.
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will become more frequent in cases where membership in an association
satisfying the 1964 Act's definition of a private club is connected to a property right seemingly protected under section 1982 of the 1866 Act.
III. Conclusion
The decision in Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Ass'n expresses
the Court's continued determination to interpret section 1982 of the 1866
Civil Rights Act broadly. This decision was readily foreseeable in light
of the mandate of Jones v. A lfred H. Mayer Co. to read the provisions of
the 1866 Act in a broad and sweeping manner5 3 and in view of the fact that
this case was factually indistinguishable from Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park.
Indeed, affirmance of the fourth circuit's decision by the Supreme Court
would have limited the scope of section 1982 to transfers of present valuable
rights incident to real property transactions in contradiction to the implications of the Court's previous holdings in Jones and Sullivan.
Nonetheless, there remains the question whether the 1866 Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Significantly, the
majority in Sullivan and Jones had specifically rejected the assertion that
by enacting comprehensive civil rights legislation Congress impliedly repealed
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 54 Moreover, the 1964 Act contains a saving clause which provides that nothing in title II shall prevent any plaintiff from enforcing rights based on laws "not inconsistent" with that statute. 15 Basic differences between the scope and coverage of the two acts illustrates that the 1964 Act was not intended to replace the 1866 Act in
its entirety.5 6 The Court in Tillman, however, failed to set down any guidelines for determining which statute shall prevail in situations where membership in a club is arguably incident to a sale of property. Therefore the
issue left for future determination by the Court is which statute will take precedence in those factual situations where both Acts appear to apply.
Roberta Liebenberg
53. 392 U.S. at 437.

54. 396 U.S. at 237-38.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) (1970). Since title II contains no provisions repealing or
reversing the terms of any earlier legislation, it is unlikely that Congress intended the
1964 statute to affect the validity or application of any existing remedy.
56. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is a narrowly drawn statute designed to
assure equal access in all places of public accommodation, while the 1866 Act was
broadly designed to prohibit racially discriminatory restriction in the sales of property
and contracts. For further analysis as to the differences between title II and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 see, 69 COLUM. L. RaV. supra note 20, at 1027-54.
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CRIMINAL LAW-Search and Seizure-Mere Presence in an
Airport Is a Factor in Justifying a Frisk-Skyjacking Danger
Justifies Extension of Scope of Frisk Beyond "Pat Down"United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973)

The danger of aircraft hijacking now justifies declaring an airport a critical
zone in which special fourth amendment considerations apply, according to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Moreno.'

The court

of appeals eased restrictions on both the initiation and the scope of warrantless airport security searches, 2 and upheld a search of a man who was
present in the airport but had not attempted to board an aircraft, 3 nor conformed to the behavioral profile, 4 nor even activated a metal-detecting magnetometer. 5
Defendant Moreno's unusual behavior attracted the attention of Deputy
U.S. Marshal Granados when Moreno first deplaned at San Antonio and

then again when Moreno returned to the airport a few hours later. On further observation, Granados noticed that Moreno had a bulge in his coat
1. 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3196 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
2. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Supreme Court
has ruled that a search may be permissible even without a warrant if it is reasonable.
Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
The reasonableness of warrantless airport security searches has been considered in a number of cases summarized infra notes 19
and 22. For a general discussion of the boundaries of the reasonableness standard
since the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), see Note, 39 TENN.
L. REV. 354 (1972).
3. Defendant Moreno was actually in a restroom when stopped for questioning.
4. The Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) behavioral profile is a series of
criteria developed by a study of the characteristics of known hijackers. These criteria
have typically been applied by airlines personnel to prospective passengers to determine which such passengers should receive further attention. Usually about 99.5% of
passengers would be cleared by the profile. Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates,- VILL. L. REV. - (1973) (not yet published) [hereinafter referred
to as Dailey]. The profile itself is secret, but in U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) the court decided it did not discriminate by religion, origin, politics, or
race. The profile was part of an F.A.A. screening system which became compulsory in
February, 1972. Dailey at -.
For detailed discussions of the profile see U.S. v.
Lopez, supra; Note, Airport Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1039 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Airport Security Searches]; and McGinley
and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM
L. REV. 293 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McGinley and Downs].
5. The magnetometer detects objects of ferrous metal which may be weapons.
See n.4 supra.
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pocket. In the ensuing encounter, Granados conducted a pat-down search
of Moreno which disclosed no weapon; nevertheless Moreno was ordered to
take off his coat. The coat was then searched, and the bulge was discovered
to be three packages of heroin.
Basing its decision on Terry v. Ohio,6 the court of appeals decided that a
warrantless search under Terry may be justified not solely by danger to the
officer himself but also by danger to others 7-to wit, persons soon to be airborne. The court described an airport security search as an exceptional
and exigent situation under the fourth amendment and decided that Granados' search met the standard of reasonableness. A search such as that
conducted by Granados, though greater in scope than the pat-down authorized by Terry, was valid since there was "a proper basis for an air piracy
investigation.

...
8

Mass searches without probable cause, of both passengers and carry-on
luggage, are now routine throughout the country. 9 Though Moreno was
not himself involved in a mass search, the court of appeals nevertheless relied in part on the rationale behind such mass searches to uphold the discretionary search. Therefore, the constitutional basis of these searches deserves analysis.
Terry v. Ohio and Airport Security Searches
A warrantless airport security search does not fit comfortably into the protective frisk for weapons authorized by the Supreme Court in Terry. There,
the Supreme Court emphasized that to justify an intrusion such as a frisk "the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."' 10 In Sibron v. New York," decided with Terry, the
Supreme Court stated explicitly that the police officer "must be able to point
to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The suspects in Terry appeared to be planning an armed
robbery. To protect himself, the officer conducted a pat-down search of their outer
clothing, looking for weapons. The Supreme Court upheld this warrantless search
though there was no probable cause for arrest.
7. 475 F.2d at 47, 51.
8. Id.at 51.
9. Effective January 5, 1973, the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 C.F.R. Part
107) were amended to require electronic searches of all passengers and inspection
searches of all carry-on items. S. REP. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1973).
For a thoughtful analysis of the impact of airport security searches on the fourth
amendment, see Gora, The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriving, Departed, or
Cancelled?, - VILL. L. REV. - (1973). [Gora is affiliated with the American Civil
Liberties Union.]
10. 392 U.S. at 21.
11. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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armed and dangerous.' u2
This reasoning is clearly no support for any system of universal searches,
such as that instituted by the Federal Aviation Administration in January,
1973.13 Similarly, the previous system of selective searches, instituted in
February, 1972,'14 could not satisfy this requirement of individualized particular facts. That system, which resulted in a relatively small number of
searches, was based upon the FAA behavioral profile.
Unfortunately, of the persons searched as a result of being selected by the
profile, only 6 percent did in fact have weapons.' 5 An inference which is
wrong 94 percent of the time hardly deserves the adjective "reasonable."
The same is true of activation of the magnetometer, since about half of the
people who walk through the magnetometer activate it,' 6 and about 70 per17
cent of carry-on baggage will activate it.
Despite this inability of either the behavioral profile or the magnetometer to provide any basis whatsoever for a reasonable inference that a given
individual is armed, courts are naturally reluctant to allow potential hijackers free access to aircraft. Thus, several federal and state courts have
in effect allowed security officers to point to the suspect's mere attempt to
board an aircraft as one of the "specific and articulable facts" required by
Terry "8' as a basis for the inference that the suspect is armed. Even though
attempting to board an aircraft is not itself a suspect act, these courts
have held that when combined with activation of the metal detector or
combined with matching the behavioral profile it can cause sufficient suspicion to justify a Terry frisk.' 9
12. Id. at 64.
13. See note 9 supra.
14. This system required comparing each passenger to the behavioral profile.
Those who matched the profile were then searched by magnetometer. Hearing on the
Anti-Hijacking Act of 1971 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Committee
on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 92-97, at 102, 115 (1972). For further discussion of the implications of the 1972 system see Airport Security Searches 1052-58; McGinley & Downs 302-06.
15. U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084, 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). At the
time Lopez was decided, the profile was part of an anti-hijacking system which resulted in searches of only on the order of 0.1% of the number of passengers. Id. at
1097.
16. Id. at 1086.
17. Hearings on Anti-Hijacking Act of 1973, Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 93-94, pt. 1, at 238 (1973).
18. 392 U.S. at 21.
19. Cases in which the searches were upheld include U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp.
1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (search upheld in principle but overturned due to airline tampering with criteria of profile); U.S. v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971) (search
based neither on magnetometer nor on profile); U.S. v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th
Cir. 1972) (magnetometer alone held sufficient basis for a Terry frisk); U.S. v. Bell,
464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (search based on profile and magnetometer); U.S. v.
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These courts implicitly abandoned the Terry-Sibron requirement of specificity in the information used to justify a search. However, they did preserve the safeguard of requiring that the information come from a neutral
and unbiased source such as the magnetometer or behavioral profile.
Beyond Judicial Permissiveness
The Moreno toleration of warrantless airport searches was approached most
closely in United States v. Lindsey,20 wherein the defendant, looking very
nervous, rushed into the boarding area four minutes before departure with
two large bulges visible in his pocket. He used four different names with
the ticket agent and the U.S. Marshal. When he moved to board the plane,
the Marshal conducted a pat down search which the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals subsequently upheld. The Lindsey Court declared, "In the context of a possible airplane hijacking . . .the level of suspicion required for
Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972) (both frisk and search of carry-on luggage);
People v. Botos, 104 Cal. Rptr. 193 (Ct. App. 1972) (luggage search based on consent); People v. Strulle, 104 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 1972) (luggage search based
on consent); U.S. v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (allowed a luggage search to continue after discovery of metal which could have activated magnetometer); People v. Lopez, 13 Cr. L. 2112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1973)
(allowed a search based on less probable cause than for traditional stop-and-frisk);
U.S. v. Wilkerson, 13 Cr. L. 2254 (8th Cir. 1973) (upheld luggage search by airlines
company); People v. Kluga, 13 Cr. L. 2316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1973) (upheld
pat down search based on magnetometer); U.S. v. Rivera, 13 Cr. L. 2234 (E.D.N.Y.
1973) (pat down upheld though no warning of option of forgoing the flight); U.S. v.
Skipwith, 13 Cr. L. 2307 (5th Cir. 1973) (upheld a boarding-gate search based only
on "mere suspicion") and U.S. v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973) (search based
on an anonymous tip).
SUMMARY OF CASES WITH VALID SEARCHES
Irregular Consent
Had A
Met the
Metal
Identito
Visible
Unusual
Case
Profile
Detected
fication
Search
Bulge
Conduct
U.S. v. Lopez
Yes
Yes
Yes
Lindsey
Yes
Yes
Yes
Epperson
Yes
•
Bell
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Slocum
Yes
Yes
Yes
Botos
Yes
Yes
Yes
Strulle
Yes
Yes
Mitchell
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
People v. Lopez
Yes
Yes
Yes
Wilkerson
(fruit of a mass luggage search)
Kluga
Yes
Rivera
Yes
Yes
Skipwith
Yes
Yes
Legato
(anonymous tip)
Yes
As this table indicates, courts have found a variety of bases for airport security
searches.
20. 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971). In Lindsey there was no mention of a magnetometer, which may not have been in operation at that airport at that time (March
20, 1970).
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161

a Terry investigative stop and protective search should be lowered." However, the Lindsey panel identified the limited time available to the Marshal
(four minutes) and the context of an actual airline boarding as important
elements in the circumstances which justified even the limited pat down
search conducted.
Moreno thus represents a relaxation of the reasonableness requirement
well beyond available precedent. In Moreno Marshal Granados faced no
time pressure. He was not confronting a suspect at the point of boarding
an aircraft. The search he conducted went beyond a carefully limited pat
down search for weapons. Furthermore, regardless of the statistical merits
of the behavioral profile and the magnetometer, at least it may be said that
they provide neutral and objective information. 21 Marshal Granados used
neither the profile nor a magnetometer; he searched Moreno because of
subjective observations of a person who was merely within the confines of
the airport.
In several cases 22 airport security searches have been overturned, despite
the fact that in each of them the search took place only after the suspect
had attempted to enter the boarding area. Recently the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals excluded evidence found in a search based solely on the fact
that the suspect matched the profile. A profile standing alone, it was held,
does not establish reasonable suspicion. Three district courts have excluded evidence found in luggage searches: where the luggage had been
previously checked, where the owner of the luggage was given no opportunity to decline the search on condition that he not board the plane, and
where the scope of the search included the contents of a small envelope
with a one-quarter inch bulge at one end. The Supreme Court of New York
excluded the fruits of a search based solely on a bulging pocket.
21. For the F.A.A. behavioral profile's neutrality and objectivity we must rely on
the in camera investigation by the Court in U.S. v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). That the Lopez Court was sensitive to this issue is shown by its reversal of
the conviction simply because the airline had unilaterally altered the profile.
22. Cases in which searches were not upheld include People v. Erdman, 329 N.Y.S.2d
654 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (bulge in pocket); U.S. v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (luggage search); U.S. v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (no
option to decline search); U.S. v. Kroll, 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972); (search
valid at outset but too extensive in scope); and U.S. v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723
(2d Cir. 1973) (suspect merely matched the profile).
SUMMARY OF CASES WITH INVALID SEARCHES
Irregular Consent
Had A
Met the
Metal
Identito
Visible
Unusual
Case
Profile
Detected
fication
Search
Bulge
Conduct
Erdman
No
No
Yes
No
Allen
Meulener
Kroll

Yes
Yes

Ruiz-Estrella

Yes

-

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

-

-

-

-

No

-

Yes

-

No
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Articulable Facts: Specific or Merely General?
An attempt to board an aircraft occurs in the case of all passengers,
whether hijacker or not. It is not a specific fact particularly relevant to
any one passenger. It does not distinguish one person from the next; rather
it is a fact equally true for all. As to supporting an inference that a suspect was armed, the common denominator of the pre-Moreno cases upholding searches is that the suspect's attempt to board an aircraft was treated
as if it were a specific, particular fact applicable to the suspect and not to
his neighbor. Such a general fact is not the "unusual conduct" contemplated
24
23
by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, and it is not acceptable.
In Moreno, of course, the general fact of attempting to board an aircraft has been supplanted by an even more general fact: presence in an
airport.

Moreno has thus eliminated both safeguards against arbitrary and biased
decisions to search: the requirement that the information justifying the
search be specific and the requirement that the information be neutral and
objective.
Conclusion: An Ominous Precedent
Moreno has significantly broadened a previously limited exception to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment and greatly expanded
the permissible scope of warrantless searches beyond the previously permissible carefully limited search of a suspect's outer clothing for weapons.
The designation of an airport as a "critical zone" was justified, in the
eyes of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by the "overwhelming public interest" involved. 25 The danger of this judicial toleration of warrantless searches
was well described by Judge Mansfield, concurring in United States v. Bell:
If the danger to the public posed by the current wave of hijackig were held to constitute adequate ground for such a broad
expansion of police power, the sharp increase in the rate of serious
crime in our major cities could equally be used to justify similar
searches of persons or houses in high crime areas based solely
upon the 'trained intuition' of the police. With the door thus
opened, a serious
abuse of individual rights would almost inevit26
ably follow.
The permissible scope of a Moreno search apparently now extends to items
23. 392 U.S. at 30.
24. "This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
392 U.S. at 21, n.18.
25. 475 F.2d at 45, 51.
26. 464 F.2d 667, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
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as unweaponlike in size and appearance as a "detonator planted in a
fountain pen."'27 This raises difficult questions. For example, how can
such an extensive search be distinguished, in practice, from a search for
contraband? How far may an officer go in his search, when he claims he is
looking for an object too small to cause a visible bulge in the suspect's
clothing? If the only limit to the scope of each search is to be the theoretical
ingenuity of hijackers, will airport security officers be entitled to conduct
forced searches of body cavities?
Aircraft hijacking poses a serious risk to passenger safety. However,
another danger from airport security searches is the serious risk to passenger freedom. We must not close our eyes to either danger.
Joseph R. Whaley

COMMERCIAL PAPER-Uniform Commercial Code 3-419(3)
Does Not Protect Collecting Bank Which Takes Check With
Forged Endorsement From Conversion Liability-Cooper v.
Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1973).

Efforts of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) draftsmen to protect
a collecting bank or depositary bank' from liability by means of section
3-419(3) for unknowingly taking a check with a forged endorsement suffered another blow 2 in the case of Cooper v. Union Bank.3 Following
pre-code law 4 rather than the purpose of section 3-419(3), the California
Supreme Court played upon the use of the word "proceeds" to substantiate
27. 475 F.2d at 49.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 4-105(a): "'Depository bank' means the first
bank to which an item is transferred for collection even though it is also the payor
bank;" (d): "'Collecting bank' means any bank handling the item for collection
except the payor bank."
2. See discussion in J. WmTE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 502-05, § 15-4 (1972).
3. 9 Cal. 3d, 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
4. See cases cited in Annot., 100 ALR2d 670 (1965) involving the "right of check
owner to recover against one cashing it on forged or unauthorized indorsement and
procuring payment by drawee," and cases cited in 9 Cal. 3d 129 at n.6, 507 P.2d at 614
n.6, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 6 n.6.
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its determination that the collecting banks still retained the proceeds of the
instruments and were thus liable to the true owners. Section 3-419(3)
reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank,
who has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative
dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was
not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the
true owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his
hands.5
From December 1965 to February 1967, an attorney's secretary had
forged her employer's endorsement on 29 checks. Some checks she cashed
at defendant Union Bank (Union) while the remainder were cashed or
deposited to her personal account at Crocker Citizens National Bank
(Crocker); both banks collected on these checks from the defendant payor
banks. 6 Prior to discovery of the forgeries, the secretary withdrew the
entire amount of the checks.
The attorney and co-members of a joint business venture, as payees,
7
sued the collecting and payor banks for conversion. The court of appeals,
affirming the trial court's findings," held that since the collecting banks as
well as the payor banks had observed reasonable commercial standards,
under section 3-419(3) they were not liable. It further affirmed the trial
court's ruling that under section 3-4069 the collecting and payor banks were
protected from liability as to those checks taken after April 1, 1966, because
of plaintiffs' negligence in not discovering the secretary's forgeries by that
date. 10
While the key issue in the lower courts had been whether defendant banks
observed reasonable commercial standards," the California Supreme Court,
in holding that the collecting banks' retention of the proceeds deprived them
of protection under section 3-419(3), did not find it necessary to scrutinize
5. U.C.C., § 1-201(35): "'Representative' includes an agent . .. ."
6. U.C.C., § 4-105(b): "'Payor bank' means a bank by which an item is payable
as drawn or accepted."
7. 103 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Ct. App. 1972).
8. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, No. 916,635 (1971).
9. "Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes ... to the
making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the . . . lack of authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays
the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business." CALIF. COMM. CODE, § 3406.
10. However, the collecting banks and payor banks were not holders in due course
(see definition in U.C.C., § 3-302) because the forged endorsements prevented them
from being holders within the meaning of U.C.C., § 1-201(20).
11. 103 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
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the banks' conduct. The court explained that the collecting banks, as either
purchasers of the cashed checks or as agents of the depositor for collection on
the instruments, retained the proceeds of these checks. The true owners,
by bringing this action against the collecting banks, had ratified their collection of the proceeds from the payor banks.
Referring to the law of constructive trusts, the court concluded that
when a collecting bank receives final settlement for an item forwarded for
collection, it becomes a debtor for the amount of that item. The money
received is mingled with the bank's other funds and, unless the bank's
funds are diminished below the amount of the instrument, the bank is
considered to retain the proceeds ".

.

. regardless of whether those instru-

12
ments were cashed or accepted for deposit.'
Buttressing its conclusion that defendant collecting banks retained the
proceeds, the court noted that the section 3-419(3) draftsmen would have
been more explicit had they intended to protect collecting banks in view of
the fact that pre-code law was nearly unanimous in holding a collecting
bank liable to the true owner for taking a check with a forged endorsement.
The court pointed out that a different interpretation of section 3-419(3)
would only result in circuity since the collecting bank would ultimately be
liable to the payor bank under its warranty of good title.'1
Further changing the lower courts' application of the U.C.C. statutes, the
court stated that although Union was liable for the seven checks cashed
prior to April 1, 1966,14 under section 3-40415 plaintiffs' negligence precluded them from recovering from the collecting banks for the checks
taken after that date even though their conduct may have been below
reasonable commercial standards.
While the Cooper opinion dealt with several important issues, each
deserving of lengthy analysis, its primary importance is its undermining,
through a contrived application of banking and constructive trusts theories,
of the section 3-419(3) draftsmen's intent to protect a collecting bank from
conversion liability for payment on a forged endorsement. Significant also
is the court's use of section 3-404 to exonerate the collecting banks because
of plaintiffs' negligence without requiring the collecting banks to prove
their observance of reasonable commercial standards. Although Cooper

12. 9 Cal. 3d at 131, 507 P.2d at 615-16, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
13. CALIF. COMM. CODE, § 4207(1): "Each customer or collecting bank who obtains payment or acceptance of an item and each prior customer and collecting bank
warrants to the payor bank or other payor who in good faith pays or accepts the
item that (a) he has a good title to the item or is authorized to obtain payment or
acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title ......
9 Cal. 3d at 133, 507 P.2d
at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
14. All the checks taken by Union were cashed.
15. CALIF. COMM. CODE, § 3404(1): "Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it. ..."
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presented a number of important issues, the scope of this article will be
limited to an analysis of the court's shaping of the key issue in terms of

the meaning of "proceeds" and its employment of that issue to determine,
or rather evade, the section 3-419(3) draftsmen's intent.
Ervin's Continuationof Pre-CodeLaw

The Cooper court was not the first to evade the section 3-419(3) draftsmen's
intent. In Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 16 the only other case decided

under the U.C.C. substantially similar in facts and issues to Cooper, the
Pennsylvania court held that there was no express provision of the U.C.C.
concerning the collecting bank's liability for a check taken with a forged
endorsement, so therefore pre-code law must be followed.

The collecting bank's liability to the payee for cashing a check with a
forged endorsement was well established under pre-code law and the Uniform

Negotiable Instruments Law. 17 The ratification theory mentioned in Cooper
was frequently used,' 8 while other cases said the payee was entitled to recover
in conversion.' 9 According to the Ervin court, section 3-419(3) ".
speaks of something other than the negotiating or the honoring of a check
when it refers to the representative having 'dealt with an instrument or its
proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner.'"20

While the

Ervin court held that prior law applied regardless of whether the check was
cashed or accepted for deposit, 21 it implied that there was no doubt as to
the defendant's possessing the proceeds since the checks, all having been

cashed, were purchased with the bank's own money and the proceeds then

22
collected from the drawee banks.

16. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 84 Dauph. 280, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473
(1965), 3 U.C.C. Rep. 311 (1965).
17. See cases cited in F. BEUTEL, BEUTEL's BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW, § 23 (7th ed. 1971) and note 4 supra.
18. Independent Oil Men's Assn. v.Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142
N.E. 458 (1924); Portland Cement Co. v.United States Nat. Bank of Denver, 61 Colo.
334, 157 P. 202 (1916).
19. See cases cited inAnnot., supra note 4,at 677.
20. 3 U.C.C. Rep. at 318. Bailey explains that what the court suggested was
[I]f the bank had dealt with an unauthorized agent of the payee who cashed the
check after getting the payee's genuine indorsement, the bank would not be liable."
H. BAILEY, THE LAW OF BANK CHECKS, § 15.14, 496, 500 n.223 (4th ed. 1969).
21. 3 U.C.C. Rep. at 315.
22. "Even though this subsection [§ 3-419(3)] should be held to apply here it can
give defendant no solace, for as we view it, defendant still has the proceeds of all of
the checks in its hands. When it purchased or cashed the forged checks drawn on

other banks it did so with its own money and then, in putting them through for collection it obtained from the drawee banks money which belongs to the plaintiff." 3
U.C.C. Rep. at 319.
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Retention of Proceeds
While the Cooper court used the law of constructive trusts as a basis for
deciding that a collecting bank, which takes a check with a forged endorsement, retains the proceeds after payment to the forger, Ervin commentators 23
opined that an important factor in determining whether the bank retains the
proceeds is whether the bank cashes the check or takes it for deposit.
The commentators theorized that when a bank cashes a check, it retains the
proceeds since it is not the "representative" referred to in 3-419(3) having
24
purchased the check with its own money and then collected the proceeds;
but when it takes a check for deposit, it parts with the proceeds since it is
a representative for collection. The Cooper court summarily rejected this
theory in a footnote. 251 Making no distinction between the checks cashed
and those taken for deposit by the collecting banks, the court viewed the
collecting banks as retaining the proceeds in both situations. 26
The court could have used U.C.C., sections 4-201(1) and 4-208(2)
to determine whether the collecting banks had the proceeds. Section
4-201 (1)27 could be viewed as assuring the bank's agency status regardless
of whether the check is cashed or taken for deposit, although a reading of
that subsection does not reveal with certainty that a collecting bank which
28
cashes a check is an agent.
Following pre-code law, 29 section 4-208(2) using the "first-in, first-out
rule," provides that ". . credits given are first withdrawn." ". . . [T]he
ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY IN BANKING AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 54-57, 1968 (dialogue between Prof.
Allan Farnsworth and Fairfax Leary, Jr.); BAILEY, supra note 20, at 499-500;

23.

UNDER

E.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Fairfax Leary, Jr., UCC Brief No. 10: Forgery and Alteration
of Checks, 14 PRACT. LAWYER, 77, 79-80 (1968).
24. ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, supra note 23, at 56-57; BAILEY, supra
note 20, at 499-500; and PRACT. LAWYER, supra note 23, at 79-80.
25.

"Commentators have suggested that the Ervin case may stand for the rule that

the collecting bank parts with the proceeds if it accepts an instrument for deposit in an
account and later pays out the money in the account but does not part with the
proceeds if it cashes the instrument. . . . There appears to be no practical rationale
for this arbitrary solution, and the Ervin decision clearly appears to negate it ....
9 Cal. 3d at 131-32 n.12, 507 P.2d at 616 n.12, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 8 n.12.
26. 9 Cal. 3d at 130, 507 P.2d at 614, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 6. As it turned out, the
only liability found was that of Union for the checks it had cashed over the counter
prior to April 1, 1966, so that the collecting banks were not responsible for any checks
which had been taken for deposit.
27. U.C.C., § 4-201(1): ". . . [P]rior to the time that a settlement given by a
collecting bank for an item is or becomes final . . . the bank is an agent . . . of the

owner of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional. This provision
applies . . . even though credit given for the item is subject to immediate withdrawal .... "
28. ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSES OF STUDY, supra note 23, at 57; BAILEY, supra
note 20, at 499.
29. See cases cited in Annot. 59 A.L.R.2d 1173, 1190, (1958). Crediting proceeds
of negotiable paper to depositor's account as constituting bank a holder in due course.
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first amounts withdrawn from the account are to be applied against the
oldest deposits, and as soon as the proceeds of the instrument have been
withdrawn under such computation, the bank has given consideration for
the instrument .... ,"30 Although section 4-208(2) would not have changed
the outcome in Cooper,"' it nevertheless could have been used by the court
in its efforts to ascertain when a collecting bank may be considered to retain
the proceeds.

The section 4-208(2) approach would comply with the

solution suggested by Fairfax Leary, Jr. that "[a] balance sheet approach
seems preferable. Namely, are the bank's assets still inflated as a result
of the transaction and the cancelling of liability to its customer? If so,
3' 2
that should be the extent of its liability."
Evasion of the Draftsmen's Intention

Whatever the U.C.C.
they did not intend,
pre-code law. 33 At
respective comments
collecting bank.34

draftsmen had in mind when creating section 3-419(3),
as the Cooper court erroneously concluded, to follow
least 11 states, including California, mention in their
to section 3-419(3) that it is intended to protect a
Furthermore, settling a pre-code controversy,3 5 the

30. Id. at 1176.
31. As mentioned previously, the only liability found was that of Union before
April 1, 1966, up to which date it had cashed checks, but had taken none for deposit.
32. PRACT. LAWYER, supra note 23, at 80.

33.

CLARKE, BAILEY AND YOUNG, BANK

DEPOSITS

AND COLLECTIONS,

167 (3rd ed.

1963); White and Summers, supra note 2, at 502; Bailey, supra note 20, at 499;
State of New York Law Revision Commission Legislative Document No. 65(D),
Article 3-Commercial Paper, 1079 (1955).
According to § 3-419, Comment 5, "Subsection (3) which is new, is intended to adopt the rule of decisions which has held
that a representative, such as a broker or depositary bank, who deals with a negotiable
instrument for his principal in good faith is not liable to the true owner for conversion
of the instrument or otherwise, except that he may be compelled to turn over to the
true owner the instrument itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his
hands ....
." While at least three cases where brokers were protected from liability
because they acted in good faith have been found, First Nat. Bank v. Goldberg,
340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941); Gruntal v. National Surety Co., 254 N.Y. 468,
173 N.E. 682 (1930); Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918),
none of the few cases protecting depositary banks gave good faith as the reason.
Fernon v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 190 So. 2d 504 (La. Ct. App. 1966) and
M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 159 La. 752, 106 So.
292 (1925)-check never paid because not accepted by drawee bank or collecting
bank so payee's remedy was against drawer; Soderlin v. Marquette Nat. Bank, 8
N.W.2d 331 (Minn. 1943)-collecting bank not liable because not unjustly enriched.
34. ANN. CAL. CODES, v. 23B, § 3419 (West 1964); FLA. STAT. ANN., V. 19B,
§ 673.3-419 (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 26, § 3-419 1(963); ANN. IND. STAT., v. 5,

§ 19-3-419 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN., v. 35A, § 554.3419 (1967); CONSOL. LAWS OF
N.Y. ANN., bk. 622, § 3-419 (McKinney 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. title 12A, § 3-419
(West 1963); PA. STAT. ANN., Title 12 A, § 3-419 (West 1970); CODE OF S.C. ANN.,
v. 2A, § 10.3-419 (1966); REV. CODE OF WASH. ANN., title 62A, § 62A.3-419 (1966);
WIS. STAT. ANN. v. 40B, § 403.419 at 289 (West 1964).
35. BAILEY, supra note 20, at 496.
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draftsmen assured a payee recourse against a drawee bank which takes a
check on a forged endorsement through section 3-419(1)(c). 3 6
The Cooper court, in assuming that the U.C.C. draftsmen would have
been more explicit had they intended to change pre-code law, and in finding
that the comments to section 3-419(3) showed no change, either misread or
misinterpreted the California comment and the Official Comment. 37 By
using a collecting bank's liability to the drawee bank under its warranty
as evidence that the draftsmen intended that the collecting bank should be
liable to the payee, 38 the court ignored Comments 5 and 6 to section
3-419(3). Taken together, these express the opinion that a collecting bank
should have a ready defense against the payee despite its liability to the
39

drawee bank.

When the Cooper court evaded the draftsmen's intent, it had much company, 40 since only one other case has been found which used section 3-419 (3)
as its draftsmen intended. 4 1 Most courts have found the collecting bank
liable under the U.C.C. While the Ervin and Cooper cases are the only
ones which analyzed section 3-419(3), other courts, where the situation was
ripe for the application of that subsection, did not mention it.42 In still
other instances of judicial scrutinizing, it was found that the collecting
43
bank did not observe reasonable commercial standards.
Conclusion
The weaknesses in the Cooper court's reasoning emphasize the groping
quality of its efforts to follow pre-code law and to flauntingly evade the
section 3-419(3) draftsmen's intent by using an erroneous definition of
36. "An instrument is converted when (c) it is paid on a forged indorsement."
U.C.C., § 3-419(1)(c).
37. 9 Cal. 3d at 132-34, 507 P.2d at 617-18, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9. See Comment 5,
supra note 33. The California Code comment 5 reads: Subdivision (3) is now statutory law. Its basic premise that a person dealing in good faith with the property of
another is not liable for conversion is consistent with prior California law on the tort

of conversion."

ANN. CAL. CODES,

v. 23B, § 3419 at 395 (West 1964).

38. 9 Cal. 3d at 133, 507 P.2d at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
39. U.C.C., § 3-419, Comment 6 states that the collecting bank is still liable under
its warranty even though it is not liable to the owner of the instrument.

40. See discussion in J.

WHITE AND

R.

SUMMERS,

supra note 2, at 504, 508.

41. Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
42. Von Gohren v. Pacific National Bank, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467
(1973); Miss. Bank and Trust Co. v. County Supplies and Diesel Service, Inc., 253
So. 2d 828 (Miss. 1971); Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens National
Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Cal. App. 1967); Huntingdon Co. v. First-Grange National
Bank, 20 Pa. D. & C. 2d 418 (1959).
43. F.D.I.C. v. Marine National Bank, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970); Belmar
Trucking Corp. v. American Bank and Trust Co., 316 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Civil Ct., N.Y. Cty.
1970); Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162
(1968).
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It is highly questionable that the "proceeds" in section

3-419(3) was intended by the draftsmen to be the same as the proceeds
encompassed within constructive trusts theory. Why would the draftsmen
include a provision in Article 3 that would shield a collecting bank only
in the unlikely event of its funds dwindling below the amount of an instrument? In addition, it is difficult to understand how the court could have
reasoned 44 that section 3-419(3) applies only to situations involving investment brokers and not to the typical bank collection transaction, 45 since it is
doubtful that a subsection on investment brokers would be placed in Article
3.46

On the other hand, the advantages given by the court for holding a collecting bank liable are sound-avoidance of circuitous action, the likelihood
that the collecting bank will be geographically close to the payee, and the
payee's having to sue only one collecting bank as opposed to many drawee
banks. 47 But it must also be considered that the collecting bank can
assert the defenses of sections 4-207(4) and 4-406(5) 48 against the drawee
49
bank, defenses not assertable against the payee.
The tendency of courts to follow pre-code law by holding collecting banks
liable, coupled with the likelihood that the faulty Cooper opinion, as one
of only two cases to analyze section 3-419(3), will be used in the future as
support for more evasion of the true purpose of section 3-419(3), make
manifest the imperative need for a redrafting of that subsection. Such
redrafting should leave no room for contrived interpretations that will avoid
the subsection's purpose of protecting a collecting bank that takes a check
on a forged endorsement.
Judy Hoffman

44. As did the Ervin Court, 3 U.C.C. Rep. at 319.
45. 9 Cal. 3d at 134, 507 P.2d at 618, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
46. Article 3 applies to drafts, checks, certificates of deposit and notes. U.C.C.,
§ 3-103, Comment 1. See also U.C.C., § 3-101, Comment.
47. ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, supra note 23, at 54.
48. U.C.C., § 4-207(4): "Unless a claim for breach of warranty under this section is
made within a reasonable time after the person claiming learns of the breach, the person
liable is discharged to the extent of any loss caused by the delay in making claim."
U.C.C., § 4-406(5): "If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a
claim of a customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon
request to assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank or
other prior party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim."
49. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 184
N.E.2d 358, 363 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1962). This case gives the same reasons for
not allowing the drawer to sue a collecting bank.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Eleventh Amendment-State Sovereign Immunity Bars Employee Suits In Federal Court Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Employees of the Department of
Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health and
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).

Sovereignty
The power of Congress under the commerce clause 1 to condition state participation in a regulated activity on amenability to suit in the federal courts
has become a controversial issue of judicial and legislative concern. The basis of the controversy can be found in the Constitution itself, in which the concept of state sovereignty is protected by the eleventh amendment, while, at the
same time, the plenary nature of the power granted Congress under the commerce clause is reinforced by judicial interpretation. The inevitable
confrontation sets the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
under the commerce clause against the eleventh amendment right of the
states to be free from federal court suit, absent consent. In Employees of
the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Public Health
and Welfare2 (hereinafter Missouri Employees) the Supreme Court attempted
to reconcile these countervailing views.
Petitioners, employees of various Missouri state institutions,3 brought a
class action suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri to recover unpaid overtime compensation allegedly due them under Section 16(b) 4 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 5 The trial
court sustained defendants'6 motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8.
2. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).

3. Plaintiffs were employees of five mental hospitals and a cancer hospital owned
and operated by the State of Missouri, and employees of the state training school for

girls operated under the Department of Corrections of the State of Missouri.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) reads:

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of
this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount
of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation as the
case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or

themselves and other employees similarly situated.

...

5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).

6. Defendants were the Department of Public Health and Welfare of the State of
Missouri, the State Board of Training Schools and various officials having supervision

over the state hospitals and training schools who were sued in their official capacities
and as individuals.
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of the state's eleventh amendment immunity to suit.' A panel for the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed," but on the filing of a petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals sitting en banc9 vacated the panel
decision and affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the
suit was barred by the eleventh amendment and that Missouri had not
waived its sovereign immunity nor consented to the suit.
Before the Supreme Court on certiorari, petitioners presented the Court
with the issue of whether the 1966 amendments to the FLSA 10 barred the
defense of eleventh amendment immunity to suit, absent the State's express
consent. The Court responded by holding that although the 1966 amendments to the FLSA extended statutory coverage of the Act to employees
of state owned hospitals and related institutions, the amendments did not
deprive a state of its constitutional immunity to suit in a federal forum by
employees of its nonprofit institutions.
Justices Marshall and Stewart concurred with the Court's decision, stating
that the issue was one of "the susceptibility of the State to suits before federal
tribunals,"" and that Missouri had neither consented to suit, nor waived
its constitutional immunity to be sued. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented vigorously and found that, "under our constitutional system . . . a State is not
the sovereign of its people. Rather, its people are sovereign,' 1 2 citing as
evidence of this principle the trend toward limitation of the defense of governmental immunity.
State sovereign immunity from suit by individuals has traditionally been
grounded in the eleventh amendment,' 3 which ostensibly does not bar suits
against a State by its own citizens. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in Hans
v. Louisiana,'4 held that such suits were not ones to which the judicial power
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." Although the eleventh amendment does not mention suits
brought by a citizen against his own state, it has been construed as a bar to such suits.
See notes 13-17 infra and accompanying text.
8. No. 20,204 (8th Cir., April 2, 1972).
9. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970). See notes 25-37 infra and accompanying text.
11. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 294 (1973) (Marshall & Stewart, J.J., concurring).
12. Id. at 322-23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. The eleventh amendment was passed as a reaction to the decision in Chisholm,
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), in which the Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear a suit brought against a state by citizens of another state.
14. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans, the plaintiff as an individual attempted to sue his
own state and argued that the eleventh amendment did not apply to such a suit.
It is unclear whether the decision was based on the eleventh amendment or on common
law sovereign immunity. The majority discussed at length the eleventh amendment
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extends. Thus, suits by citizens against their own state were precluded by
this expansion of the eleventh amendment. A steady change of opinion,
however, has gradually undermined the exception of the sovereign's freedom
from ordinary legal responsibility.1 Recent use of the doctrine of implied
consent or waiver has been employed where Congress has preconditioned
state participation in a regulated activity on the state's amenability to suit
in the federal courts. 16 Specifically, in the instant case, the issue arose
whether, under Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks
Department,'7 a state is deemed to have waived its eleventh amendment
immunity to citizen-employee suits when it continues to engage in activities

brought under congressional regulation.
While the issue of state immunity to suit in state courts was admittedly
left unresolved, this article will concern itself solely with an examination of
state immunity vis-a-vis federal court suits and will discuss relevant case
law, legislative history, and the bases upon which the Court rejected the
Pardenrationale.
The Effect of Parden on Traditional Notions of State Sovereign Immunity
In Parden, Alabama citizens sued an Alabama state-owned railway in federal
court to recover damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
and its implications and, as a result, it was generally assumed that the holding was
based on the eleventh amendment. 17 VILL. L. REV. 713, 714 (1972). See, e.g.,
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150
(1908).
15. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 627, 708 (1949)
(Frankfurter & Burton, J.J., dissenting). A state may waive immunity at pleasure,
Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933); by a general appearance in a case, Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883); or by statute, Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treas.,
323 U.S. 459 (1945). In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934),
the Court discussed the question of immunity which arises in several distinct classes of
cases: suits brought against a state (a) by another state of the Union; (b) by the
United States; (c) by the citizens of another state or by the citizens or subjects of a
foreign state; (d) by citizens of the same state or by federal corporations; and (e) by
foreign states. 292 U.S. at 328. Generally, waiver must be knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently given. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963). But cf. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184
(1964); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970).
16. The states are not immune from federal regulation under the commerce power
of Congress. In Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S.
184 (1964), the Court subjected a state-owned railway to the Federal Employer's Liability Act. In United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the Court subjected
a state-owned railroad to the Federal Safety Appliance Act. Board of Trustees v.
United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933), required a state university to pay federal custom
duties on educational equipment it imported. In Sanitary District v. United States, 266
U.S. 405 (1925), a state was prohibited from diverting water from the Great Lakes
necessary to ensure navigability, a phase of commerce.
17. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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(FELA) 18 for personal injuries sustained while employed by the defendant.
The issue involved was whether a state that owned and operated a railroad in
interstate commerce could successfully plead sovereign immunity in a federal

court suit brought against the railroad by its employees under the FELA.
After finding that the Act authorized suits in federal district against stateowned as well as privately-owned common carriers operating in interstate
commerce, 19 the Court examined Alabama's contention that Congress was
without power, in view of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, to subject a
state to suit.
The Court noted that while a state's immunity from suit by a citizen without
its consent is rooted in " 'the inherent nature of sovereignty,' . . . the States

surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the
power to regulate commerce. ' '20 Thus, a state's operation of a railroad in
interstate commerce must be in subordination to the power granted Congress under the Commerce Clause 21 and, as a result, the states necessarily

surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of
22
such regulation.
The Court concluded that an individual's right of action under the FELA
could not be precluded by sovereign immunity. The states, by venturing
into a federal realm, assumed the conditions that Congress attached and
thereby subjected themselves to federal regulation as fully as would a private person or corporation. 23 Congress, in the exercise of its power under
18. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
19. 377 U.S. at 191.
20. Id., citing as evidence of the first proposition the statement contained in Great
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 56 (1944). See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), which is authority for the nature of the power granted
Congress under the Commerce Clause:
This power [the commerce power] like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution ....
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified
objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it
would be in a single government, having as its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the
United States. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97.
21. 377 U.S. at 191. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936),
where the Court found that "[tihe sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution."
22. 377 U.S. at 192. By engaging in the railroad business a state cannot withdraw
the railroad from the power of the federal government to regulate commerce. New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
23. 377 U.S. at 196. Thus, consent to suit rested upon conditions Congress attached to the state's action, and actual consent need not be given. In so ruling, the
Supreme Court relied in part upon its earlier decision in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275 (1959), where the Court permitted a Jones Act claim
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the Commerce Clause could, therefore, force the states to choose between
entering the area of regulated activity and thereby waive immunity to
suit, or retain immunity by avoiding activity in the regulated area
24
entirely.
The FairLabor Standards Act
As was true of the legislation involved in Parden, the FLSA was enacted
by Congress pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. 2'5 The overriding purpose of the Act was to correct and eliminate
"conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and [the] general well-being of
27
The Act's basic provisions established minimum wage
workers ....
and maximum hours 28 requirements and discouraged oppressive child labor
"26

practices.

29

As originally enacted, 30 the FLSA defined the term "employer" so as
to exclude the "United States or any State or political subdivision of a
-1
In 1966, Congress modified the definition of "employer" in
order to remove the exemption of the states and their political subdivisions
with respect to employees of hospitals, institutions and schools.3 2 At the
same time, Congress expanded the definitions of "enterprise" 3 3 and "enter-

State. . ..

against a bi-state authority created by an interstate compact. Employees of the
Dep't. of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health and Welfare, 452 F.2d
820, 829 (8th Cir., 1971).
24. 17 VILL. L. REV. 713, 715 (1972).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1970).
26. Id. § 202.
27. Id. § 206.
28. Id. § 207.
29. Id. § 212.
30. 52 Stat. 1060.
31. Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, §§ 1-19, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 221-27 (1940).
32. In 1966, section 3(d) of the Act was amended and reads as follows:
Employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United
States or any State or political subdivision of a State (except with respect to
employees of a state or a political subdivision thereof, employed (1) in a hospital, institution, or school referred to in the last sentence of subsection (r)
of this section. . . . 29 U.S.C. Section 203(d) (1970).
33. Section 3(r) of the Act defines "enterprise" and was also amended in 1966 to
include:
the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the care of the
sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises of
such institution, a school for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted
children, a preschool, elementary or secondary school, or an institution of
higher education (regardless of whether or not such hospital, institution or
school is public or private or operated for profit or not for profit). ...
29 U.S.C. Section 203(r) (1970).
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prise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce" 3 4 so
as to include hospitals and related institutions whether operated privately
or publicly, for profit or not for profit.
In Maryland v. Wirtz,3 5 twenty-eight states, including Missouri, challenged
the constitutionality of the 1966 amendments to the FLSA insofar as they
affected hospitals and schools operated by states and their political subdivisions. The Court sustained the legislation as a proper exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.36 However, the Court considered
it unnecessary to decide the very question of whether employees may sue in
federal court to vindicate rights established by the 1966 amendments. Thus,
"interests of the United States, the problems of immunity, agency and con37
sent to suit" were left for resolution in appropriate future cases.
Sovereign Immunity and the FLSA: The Tenth Circuit Approach
The effect of the 1966 amendments to the FLSA and the breadth of the
waiver theory enunciated in Parden were examined in Briggs v. Sagers,3 s
where employees of a state-owned institution for the treatment of the mentally ill instituted suit pursuant to the FLSA to recover unpaid overtime
compensation and an additional amount as liquidated damages. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was faced with a question concerning
the scope of congressional authority to create a private cause of action to
recover wages due from state employers and to make that right immediately
effective on preexisting activities.39
Although the Briggs suit was brought under the auspices of the Parden
decision, the State of Utah attempted to distinguish the case on two grounds:
(1) the regulated activity in Parden was proprietary rather than governmental in nature; and (2) operation of the railway in Parden commenced
some twenty years after the enactment of the FELA; whereas Utah's operation of the institution began prior to the passage and effective date of the
1966 amendments. The court stated that "the Federal Government, when
acting within a delegated power, may override countervailing state inter34. The new language in § 203(r) was also added to subsection 203(s) which defines
"enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." See
note 33 supra.

35. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
36. The Court held that "labor conditions in schools and hospitals can affect
[interstate] commerce." Id. at 194. Moreover, "valid general regulations of commerce
do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a state is involved." Id. at 196-197.
37. Id. at 200.
38. 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970).
39. Id. at 131.
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ests whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in charac40
ter.,,
In answering the state's second contention, the Tenth Circuit found that:
Since the FLSA was enacted through the authority of the Commerce Clause, and inasmuch as the right of action imposed by the
FLSA is fully within the congressional regulatory power, it would
be incongruous to deny Congress the power to name a prompt, effective date for such amendments. To suppress that corresponding power would run counter to the plenary nature of the constitutionally defined regulatory authority and 41could, in part, defeat the purpose of urgently required legislation.
The language of Parden, therefore, and the express intent of Congress to
create a private cause of action against recalcitrant states were held to control. As a result, when Utah continued its operation of the institution
knowing of the passage of the 1966 amendments, it waived its immunity
42
to the remedies provided in the Act.
Sovereign Immunity and the FLSA: The Supreme Court
In Missouri Employees,43 a case strikingly similar to Briggs, the Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether the eleventh amendment applied to suits brought by individuals against states under the FLSA. Following the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, the Court found that "the history
and tradition of the Eleventh Amendment indicate that by reason of that
barrier a federal court is not competent to render judgment against a nonconsenting state. ' 44 Thus, the central issue before the Court became whether
Missouri had, in fact, waived its immunity to suit through its continued participation in a regulated activity.
The Parden and Briggs decisions should have acted as persuasive authority for the conclusion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity could not
preclude private suits brought under the aegis of an appropriate federal regulatory statute. 45 The Court, however, went to great lengths to distinguish
40. Id. at 133, quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968).
41. 424 F.2d at 133.
42. Id. at 134. "Although Parden does rely in part upon an intervening lapse of
twenty years [between the time of enactment of the FELA and the date of operation of
the railway], it is not so crucial to the principles involved as to cause reversal absent
that fact." Id. The dissent in Parden did not view the opinion as pivoting on the fact
of an intentional waiver. Rather, the dissenting justices understood the majority to hold
"that with regard to sovereign immunity, waiver of a constitutional privilege need be
neither knowing nor intelligent." 377 U.S. 184, 200 (1964).
43. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
44. Id. at 284.
45. The Parden and Missouri Employees cases "have in common that each is an
action for damages in federal court brought against a State by citizens of the State in
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Parden from Missouri Employees, "leading eventually to the conclusion that
sovereign immunity must be given greater weight than the Congressional
'46
legislation."
The Court first found that state hospitals and related institutions are
governmental functions and, as such, are not proprietary in nature. Yet,
the distinction has been repeatedly discredited, most recently in Maryland
v. Wirtz, 47 and was aptly criticized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as "so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of being held in the mind for
' 48
adequate formulation.
Secondly, the Court emphasized that "[b]y holding that Congress did not
lift the sovereign immunity of the states under the FLSA, we do not make the
extension of coverage to state employees meaningless. ' 49 The Court noted
that Section 16(c) 50 gives the Secretary of Labor authority to bring suit for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA
and, further, that Section 17 gives the Secretary the power to enjoin violations of the Act and to obtain restitution on behalf of employees.5 1
Yet, the Court failed to recognize that Section 16(b) 2 is an important
weapon for the enforcement of the FLSA because "it puts directly into the
hands of the employees who are effected by violation, the means and abilits employ under the authority of a regulatory statute founded on the Commerce
Clause. Parden held that a federal court determination of such suits cannot be precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the States surrendered their
sovereignty to that extent when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce.
377 U.S. at 191. That holding fits precisely this FLSA lawsuit.... "Id.
at 299
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. 17 VILL. L. REV.713, 718 (1972).
47. 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968). See also United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936), wherein the Court held that "Commerce may be equally impeded whether
the defective appliance is used on a railroad which is state-owned or privately-owned.
No convincing reason is advanced why interstate commerce and persons and property concerned in it should not receive the protection of the act whenever a state,
as well as a privately-owned carrier, brings itself within the sweep of the statute ....
297 U.S. at 185. The Court in Maryland v. Wirtz found the principle enunciated in
United States v. California to be controlling. "[This court] will not carve up the
commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce
from private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run by the
States for the benefit of their citizens." 392 U.S. at 198-99.
48. Brief for Appellant at 10, Employees of the Dep't. of Pub. Health & Welfare
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
49. 411 U.S. at 285. The Parden Court stated that it would be surprising to learn
that Congress made state railroads liable to employees under the FELA while providing
"no means by which that liability may be enforced." 377 U.S. at 197. The Court,
therefore, viewed the Parden decision as resting on the absence of alternative remedies
to private employees' suits. Brief for Appellant at 10, Employees of the Dep't. of
Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1970).
51. Id. § 17.
52. See note 4 supra.
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ity to assert and enforce their own rights, thus avoiding the assumption by
Government of the sole responsibility to enforce the act."'58 Therefore, the
alternative remedies provided are not adequate substitutes for, but rather
complement, Section 16(b) in the task of enforcing the FLSA against close
54
to two million enterprises.
The effectiveness of private employee suits under the FLSA is enhanced
by the double damages provision contained in § 16(b).5 5 Upon examination of this provision, the Court found that although such a measure would
be both an important and effective method of disciplining recalcitrant private employers, it would be far too harsh on the states and would disrupt the
"pursuit of a harmonious federalism."56
Examination of the legislative intent, however, indicates that the 1966
amendments were enacted to insure the economic well-being of the American people. The Supreme Court has consistently held that § 16(b) is not
penal in nature; rather, it provides compensation to the injured workman
for damages which cannot be specifically ascertained.5 7 Thus, the underlying policy of the Act, as well as the inclusion of the double damages provision, demonstrates that "Congress contemplated the financial burden that
the Amendments could cause for the States."55 This legislative determination was made within constitutional bounds, and therefore, should not be
disturbed by the judiciary. 59
Finally, the Court examined the 1966 amendments to the FLSA and
noted that although Congress desired to bring employees of hospitals and
related institutions under the purview of the Act, it did not amend the language of Section 16(b) so as to deprive a state of its constitutional immunity
to suit.60
53. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 n.15 (1945), where it was
stated that Section 16(b) has the virtue of "minimizing the cost of enforcement by the
Government. It is both a common-sense and economical method of regulation." Id.
54. Id. at 707-12 (1945); Hodgson v. Wheaton Glass Co., 446 F.2d 527, 529-32
(1971); McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, 177 F.2d 137, 139 (1949).
55. See note 4 supra.
56. 411 U.S. at 286. In essence it appears that the Court has attempted t3 balance
the interest of the state in maintaining a strong fiscal base which would presumably
complement the public need for state institutions and services, against the interest of
the state's own employees in remaining economically solvent.
57. See, e.g., Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 707-08 (1945);
Overnight Motor Transport Co. v. Misel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).
58. 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir. 1970).
59. Id.
60. "It would be surprising . . . to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her
constitutional immunity without changing the old Section 16(b) under which she could
not be sued or indicating in some way by clear language that the constitutional immunity was swept away." 411 U.S. at 285. Presumably the Court is referring to the
old and well known rule that statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 23:138

Contrary to the Court's interpretation of the FLSA, congressional debates
and reports show that exempting the states from section 16(b) would have
defeated the objectives of the 1966 amendments. The section 16(b)
remedy not only protects employees by affording them the opportunity
to enforce their own legal interests, but is essential to insure restoration of
the worker to the statutory minimum standard of well-being. 6 ' Moreover,
the legislative history unequivocally indicates that in order to avoid "unfair competition," states and private parties were to be treated identically
in their operation of enterprises covered by the Act.62 To effectuate this
congressional policy of uniformity, the Section 16(b) remedy must be made
available against all employers subject to the Act.
Conclusion
It has been said that as to the states, "legal irresponsibility was written into
the Constitution by the eleventh amendment." 63 Yet, in varying degrees and
at different times the momentum of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
been arrested or deflected by an unexpressed feeling that governmental immunity runs counter to prevailing notions of reason and justice. Concepts
of public morality are offended when a state may escape legal redress for its
wrongs; the decisions of Parden,Briggs and the host of cases which deal with
the limitations placed on the defense of governmental immunity have given
credence to this view.
It appears, however, that the Supreme Court has attempted to halt the
erosion of the doctrine of sovereign immumty. Specifically, its rejection
of the Parden rationale would seem to indicate a distaste for the notion that
states must choose between entering an area of regulated activity and
thereby waive immunity to suit, or retain immunity by avoiding activity
in the regulated area entirely. When viewed in this light, it can be seen that
the Court is, perhaps, not disturbed by faltering notions of sovereign immunity per se, but is instead expressing a discomfort with the fictional doctrine of implied consent as a means of circumventing the explicit intent of
the eleventh amendment.
Regardless of the theory the Court may eventually develop in order to reor privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect."
United States v. Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947).
61. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707-08 (1945).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1970). The overriding aim of this chapter is to secure for
employees covered thereby benefits of congressional economic policy that competition
in interstate commerce can not be fueled by exploitative wage practices. See also,
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
63. Larson v. Foreign and Domestic Commerce Corp., 377 U.S. 682, 708 (1949)
(Frankfurter & Burton, J.J., dissenting).
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lease the federal courts from the confines of state immunity, it is clear
that the legal emasculation of injured citizen-employees necessitates a reevaluation of the concept of sovereign immunity. However valid this doctrine may have been, increased state participation in areas traditionally belonging to the private sector requires that effective regulations be established so as to coincide with current notions of governmental responsibility.
Charlene Barshefsky

TORTS: Governmental Immunity-Board of Commissioners of
the Port of New Orleans and Other Such Boards and Agencies
Are No Longer Immune from Suit in Tort. Board of Commissioners v. Splendour S. & E. Co., 264 La. -, 273 So. 2d 19

(1973)

"Generations have genuflected before the divine altar of sovereign immunity,"' but in determining that the Dock Board of the Port of New Orleans no
longer enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit in tort, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana has launched a regicidal attack on the ancient maxim "the
King can do no wrong." The legal community is thus forced to ponder
whether the advocates of the immunity doctrine can mobilize enough strength
to bring the Court to task.
In Board of Commissioners v. Splendour S. & E. Co. 2 respondent Dock
Board filed an action in Louisiana District Court against appellant Splendour,
a shipping company, for recovery of damages incurred when appellant's vessel collided with the Florida Avenue Bridge spanning the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal, owned and operated by the Dock Board. Splendour answered
and reconvened for damages caused to the vessel, alleging that the Dock Board
failed to properly design, construct, maintain and repair the bridge and
canal, thereby constituting an obstruction and hazard to navigation. Dock
1. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.
REv. 476 (1953).

2. 264 La. -, 273 So. 2d 19 (1973); rehearing denied, 273 So. 2d 30 (La. App.
1973).
3. Black's Law dictionary defines "reconventional demand" as any plea by a defendant which constitutes more than mere defense and amounts to counterclaim.
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Board filed an exception of no right of action, alleging that it was immune from suit in tort under the sovereign immunity of the state. Th6 exception was maintained, the reconventional demand dismissed, and Splendour appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 4 holding the Dock Board, as
an agency of the state, immune from suit in tort.
After granting certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the Dock Board, and other such administrative boards and agencies of
the state, were not immune from suits in tort. The court recognized that
prior cases had held that the Board was immune from suit and that such was
the intent of the state legislature in creating the Board. Furthermore, the
court acknowledged, despite the vigorous arguments of petitioners to the
contrary, that the Board did not waive its immunity by bringing suit against
Splendour. Yet the majority declined to continue to clothe the Board with immunity, citing decisions rendered in other jurisdictions abrogating the doctrine. The Court declared that policy considerations required the termination of the Board's immunity and held that immunity was unfair, tended toward governmental irresponsibility, and was an unnecessary exception to
the policy of the state as expressed in the Louisiana Constitution. Justice
McCaleb, concurring, found that the Board waived its immunity by seeking
redress in its own courts. The dissent, filed by Justice Summers, found
that the Court had usurped the prerogative of the legislature and the will
of the people in determining the wisdom of a constitutional enactment.
Origins of the Doctrine: Common Law and Statutory Bases
It has long been the practice of many states to empower the legislature to
authorize a particular claimant to sue the state or its subdivisions in a state
court and to appropriate funds for judgment subject to the outcome of the
authorized suit. Identical provisions setting forth the procedure and effect
of any adjudication "[w]henever the General Assembly shall authorize a suit
against the state. . ." could be found in the Louisiana constitutions of 1898
and 1921. 5 Nevertheless, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a creature
of jurisprudence, antedating the state constitution. As early as 1854, in
Stewart v. City of New Orleans,0 the courts exempted a governmental
agency from liability for tort committed by its employees. Almost forty years
and numerous decisions later, in State ex rel. Hart v. Burke, the doctrine
was cited with approval and its common law origins affirmed. When the
4. Board of Commissioners v. Splendour S. & E. Co., 255 So. 2d 869 (La. App.
1972).
5. LA. CONST. art. 192 (1898); LA. CONsT. art. 3, § 35 (1921).
6. 9 La. Ann. 461 (1854).
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judiciary department of the government was instituted to expound the law
and to distribute justice among individuals, the State was not subject to
its authority.7 Judicial approval of the doctrine was as consistent as the
flood waters of the Delta; the doctrine was "elementary, fundamental, and
ancient."s
The constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to provide for suits
against the state, implemented by separate legislative enactments giving
an individual claimant the right to sue in a designated court, were interpreted
by the courts as merely permittting suits to be filed without conceding
substantive liability; 9 therefore, enactment of a separate bill admitting liability remained necessary for recovery. Only in suits enforcing already existent
tort liabilities of the state was consent to sue the state readily given; recovery
was thus permitted in limited areas as piecemeal enactments to various
complainants left others in the dark. A comprehensive scheme for tort recovery against the state was non-existent. Only where a state subdivision
was granted the power to "sue and be sued" in its legislative grant of incorporation could a claimant sue that subdivision in tort without legislative authorization.
Variations on the theme afforded no comfort to potential litigants. The
dubious governmental-proprietary function distinction provided that consent to sue in tort was limited only to actions resulting from profit-making
ventures of the state or its agencies. Where injury resulted from a governmental activity of the state no action could lie. 10
The immunity enjoyed by the Dock Board was well established. As a state
agency, it could not be sued without the state's consent. Created for the
single purpose of administering the Port of New Orleans, the Board, in effect, was the alter-ego of the state: the property under its authority was
public property; the state, as soverign and master, exercised dual authority
over the Board."
Possessing many rights and privileges of a public cor7. 33 La. Ann. 498 (1891).
8. 264 La. at -, 273 So. 2d at 28.
9. See Duree v. State, 96 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1957); rev'd Duree v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 238 La. 166, 114 So. 2d 594 (1959). See also Stephens v. Natchitoches
Parish School Board, 238 La. 388, 115 So. 2d 793 (1959).
10. See DAvis, ADMnsATRATwE LAW, § 25.01, at 468 (7th ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as DAvis] for a critical analysis of the governmental-proprietary distinction:
Streets, sidewalks and bridges are often proprietary, and police and fire departments are almost always governmental. Parks, swimming pools and recreation centers may be either. . . . At least one state has both governmental
manholes and proprietary manholes; surely some state must have mixed
manholes.
11. State ex rel. Tallant v. Board of Commissioners, 161 La. 361, 108 So. 770
(1926).
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poration, the Board lacked the crucial "sue and be sued" provision.' 2 Thus,
all plaintiffs claiming injury due to the Board's negligence were denied recovery; without legislative consent for suit they lacked standing to contest
the Board's immunity.
Recent Developments
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity was firmly entrenched in case
law and statute, its recent history could be characterized, at best, as chaotic.
The constitutional provision requiring legislative authorization for suit
against the state proved unworkable 18 and was completely rewritten in
1946. It provided the following:
Whenever the legislature shall authorize suit to be filed against
the State. . ..
The procedure in such suits. . . shall be the same
as in suits between private litigants. . . . No judgment for money
rendered against the State shall be satisfied except out of monies
appropriated by the legislature for the purpose. . . . Except
as otherwise specifically provided in this section, the effect of any
authorization shall be nothing more than a waiver of the State's immunity from suit. 14
A decade after ratification the courts were called on to construe the provision in a wrongful death suit against the state. In Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co.1 5 the Supreme Court reversed a judgment for plaintiff's decedent and
held that under Article III, Sec. 35, as amended, the legislature could not
constitutionally waive the state's immunity from liability for the negligence
of an employee; waiver of immunity from suit did not constitute waiver of
immunity from liability.'
12. Fouchaux v. Board of Commissioners, 193 La. 182, 190 So. 373 (1939): The
Court held that a public board of the state, though it may engage in the performance
of functions usually designated as proprietary, may not be sued for the results of its
operations unless the sovereignty has granted permission that suits of that character
may be brought. See also Miller v. Board of Commissioners, 199 La. 1071, 7 So. 2d
355 (1942), where the court clarified any doubts that might have been created in
Fouchaux by holding that the Dock Board was not engaged in a profit-making or
proprietary function.
13. The 1921 Constitution, art. 3, § 35 provided only the following:
Whenever the Legislature shall authorize suit to be filed against the State, it
shall provide a method of procedure and the effect of the judgments which
may be rendered therein.
The State, by consenting to suit, was signing a blank check for any judgments rendered
against it; neither the amount payable on the judgment nor the date on which it would
be due were known. The only check on legislative irresponsibility was the gubernatorial veto, rendered unconstitutional in Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. 2d 917
(1945).
14. LA. CONST. art. 3, § 35 (1946).
15. See note 9 supra.
16. The court in Duree based its decision on the wording of the legislative authorization for suit:
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This curious and strained interpretation was immediately overruled by a
1960 amendment to Article III, Sec. 35.17 The intent of the ratifiers was now
clear: each legislative authorization for suit against the state necessarily
waived the state's immunity from suit and liability. Such intent was manifested and expanded in Hamilton v. City of Shreveport'8 where the Supreme Court held that the constitutional amendment empowered the legislature not only to waive immunity from tort actions resulting from proprietary functions, but also to waive traditional immunity of the state and its
subdivisions in tort actions resulting from governmental activities where a
state subdivision (in this case a municipality) was granted the power to
sue and be sued.
The End of An Era
The Dock Board was never successfully subjected to suit in tort. There could
be no successful prosecution against the Board without legislative authorization. How then, did the Splendour court justify its abrogation of the
Board's immunity where the Board itself sued for damages against the Shipping Company? Several approaches were offered. Justice McCaleb, concurring, asserted that the Dock Board, as plaintiff, had effected a waiver of its
right to claim immunity when defendant Splendour pleaded a counterclaim
alleging damages to its vessel through the Board's negligence. Such a demand was viewed as an exception to the constitutional provision requiring
legislative authorization to effect a waiver:
[W]henever the public agency seeks redress in its own Courts, it
That nothing in this act shall be construed as conferring on [Mrs. Duree] any
different or greater claim or cause of action then she . . . may have had before the passage of this act; the purpose of this act being merely to waive the
State's immunity from suit insofar as the suit herein authorized is concerned.
See LA. AcTs 1956, House Bill No. 387 of 1956.
Plaintiff could not have sued the state in tort prior to the legislative authorization, and
that under the authorization, the legislature had not waived its immunity from liability.
If the authorization was construed to waive the state's immunity from liability, it was
unconstitutional (The Court believed that the purpose of the 1946 amendment was to
overrule Crain v. State, 23 So. 2d 336 (La. App. 1945), which held that the legislature
could constitutionally provide a remedy-recovery in tort-which wasn't available to
the claimant at the time of his injury, his only remedy being workmen's compensation), so as to preclude the legislature from authorizing a suit on a cause of action
unavailable to the claimant prior to the authorization.
17. See generally McMahon and Miller, The Crain Myth-A Criticism of the Duree
and Stephens Cases, 20 LA. L. REv. 449 (1960) for an exhaustive analysis of the
Duree ruling. The authors maintain that there was no evidence to support the assumption that the purpose of the 1946 amendment was to overrule Crain. Analysis of
legislative history, contemporaneous legal history, newspaper editorials, and legislative
construction all support a contrary intention-to require a uniform and adequate procedure for suit against the state, and to require judgments be paid through legislative
authorization subject to gubernatorial veto.
18. 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965),
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would seem but just and meet to conclude that it necessarily waives
its immunity from any claim of the defendant cognate with the main
demand. 19
The majority did not agree as they found no waiver; the Board's immunity
required that Splendour's counterclaim be dismissed. In fact, all of Splendour's arguments calling for abrogation of immunity were rejected. Legislative policy enunciated in the 1960 amendment, and reaffirmed in Hamilton was not applicable to the Board. The distinguishing feature in Hamilton was a municipal charter granting the City of Shreveport the right to
sue and be sued, yet no such provision existed with respect to the Board.
However, the majority felt that mere legal theory was insufficient justification for the continuance of the obnoxious doctrine. Legislative policy,
the unpopular decision in Duree, and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions led the majority, per Justice Dixon, to withdraw the Board's immunity:
[T]here are three reasons which move us to withdraw from the
Board the immunity with which the court has previously insulated
it from tort suits. It is unfair. It tends toward governmental irresponsibility. It is an unnecessary exception to20 the policy of the
State. . . as expressed in. . . our Constitution.
The majority apparently took heed to Judge Lemmon's concurring opinion in the lower court affirmation of the Dock Board's immunity from suit.
Agreeing that the immunity rule probably controlled, he asserted the belief
that there was never any rational or legal basis for the existence of the rule in
the state, and that to apply the rule, in light of the recent trend limiting its
2
applicability, would result in gross arbitrariness and discrimination. 1
If one were inclined to analyze the reasons given in previous decisions
why the doctrine should not be abrogated, he would find the following factors nearly always present: First, a nebulous mass of legal theory concerning
the nature of sovereignty, usually self-contradictory and always contradicted by modern legal facts of life-the Federal Tort Claims Act, the laws
of other modem nations, and lesser reforms in other states; Second, legislative and judicial inertia in an area lacking political pressure groups calling
for changes in the law; Last, financial concern, justified or not, that the state
or its subdivisions cannot afford to pay out what they would be required to
22
pay if governmental tort liability were accepted.
19. 264 La. at -, 273 So. 2d at 27.
20. Id. at -, 273 So. 2d at 25.
21. 255 So. 2d at 873.
22. See generally Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1363 (1954) for a comparative analysis of the treatment of sovereign immunity
among the several states.
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Theoretical confusion has plagued the doctrine since its inception. Application of the maxim "the King can do no wrong" in a democratic state
founded on the ideal of governmental responsibility has caused much judicial
rationalization, both state and federal. 23 It has been difficult to explain to
a litigant that he could not recover for negligently inflicted injuries because an English subject was not allowed to sue the King in the thirteenth
century. In Louisiana, the doctrine was a creature of jurisprudence, "an
anachronism without rational basis, which . . . existed by force of iner-

tia."'24 It is no wonder then, why the Splendour majority resorted to arguments of public policy in overruling the immunity rule, while conceeding all
the substantive aspects of law and precedent.
Splendour is most significant as a reversal of that same inertia which the
courts and the legislature had previously propounded. The 1960 amendment, asserting that authorization to be sued necessarily implied a waiver
of the State's immunity from liability, meant that recovery could more easily
be obtained. But the concept of waiver of consent provided its own contradictions. The distinction between state agencies-whether or not they
had a "sue and be sued" clause in their governing statutes-meant that
fortuitous circumstances dictated where a litigant would be able to collect:
I cannot justify to the losing litigant in this case an explanation that
if his claim were against the Department of Highways he could
(which does not
pursue it, but since it was against the Dock2 Board
5
have a "sue and be sued" clause), he cannot.
The potential for discrimination and arbitrariness inherent in this situation
was too much for the Splendour majority. Ignoring stare decisis and legislative prerogative over the strong objections of one dissent, the majority was
moved by the responsibility for doing justice. In reality legislative intent
regarding the immunity doctrine was not usurped-the legislature never
expressed an intent about the basic doctrine. Specific legislation regarding the
Dock Board 26 was defeated by policy expressed in the 1960 amendment.
Where commentators, scholars, lawyers, and other courts were independently
23. See Pugh, supra note 1, at 481-93 for a chronological discussion of the more
important sovereign immunity cases that have come before the United States Supreme
Court. Prof. Pugh traces the development of the doctrinal bases of immunity and
asserts that its basic inapplicability to the American political experience has caused
profound judicial confusion and rationalization.
24. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359
P.2d 457 (1961).

25. 255 So. 2d at 875.
26. The Dock Board was created by Act 70 of 1896. Its provisions are found in
Article 6, Sections 16 and 17 of the Louisiana Constitution and in LSA-R.S. 34:1-44.
LSA-R.S. 34:21 sets forth the rights and powers of the Board.
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moving in the direction of abrogation of the doctrine, responsibility to sound
27
legal development compelled the majority to act against immunity.
The once all-powerful motivation, financial fear of tort liability, was discarded:
No agency that we know of has been bankrupted by the torts of its
employees nor submerged in litigation. The agencies function.
• . . The Department of Highways works . . . . Charity Hospital
serves. . . . School Boards run schools. . . . The Sewerage
and Water Board performs its functions. . . . Shreveport is still
a good place to live. .... 28
Conclusion
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in Louisiana has been dealt a fatal
blow by the Splendour court. Holding the Dock Board and other such agencies no longer immune from suit in tort, the court has stripped the previously enjoyed immunity from those agencies lacking a "sue and be sued"
clause in their legislative grant. More than a century of case law and constitutional enactment have been relegated to the lowly status "of historical
interest only," notwithstanding constitutional provisions to the contrary.
Whether the Louisiana legislature will rise to challenge the authority of
the court through subsequent enactments remains a matter of surmise and
speculation, but it should be noted that the national trend away from immunity has been characterized by the recurrent problem of alleged judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative.29 Those adhering to the proposition that sovereign immunity is a creature of the common law believe
the matter is thus amenable to change by judicial action. Contrary views
are held as strongly: courts cannot legislate, no matter how desirous the
end may be.
Whether or not the Splendour court has usurped the legislative function,
there is good reason to believe that the legislature will not disturb the ruling;
the judiciary, taking the initiative, has abolished a doctrine of dubious value
27, For recent cases abrogating the doctrine of sovereign immunity in other states
see the following: Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107
(1963); Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, supra note 29; Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 457
(1961); Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Kentucky, 1964); and Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430,
160 N.W.2d 805 (1968).
28. 264 La. at -, 273 So. 2d at 25.
29. See DAvIs 470-73, for a discussion of the various problems encountered when
judicial action overturns the common law immunity doctrine embodied in legislative
and constitutional enactments.
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and universal condemnation. Logic and concern for the development of a
just method for recovery against the state requires that the legislature do
no less.
Barry Schwartz

TORTS-Products

Liability-Manufacturer Held Negligently

Liable For Failure To Warn of Ethical Drug's Dangers By
"Watering Down" Its Warning And Overpromoting Its Drug.

Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51.

The liability of ethical drug manufacturers for the side effects of their
products has, in the last decade, troubled courts throughout the nation. 1
The California Supreme Court recently dealt with this issue and held, in
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 2 that for "watering down" its printed warnings
and vigorously overpromoting its drug a manufacturer may be held liable for
negligently failing to warn of the drug's dangers.
Shortly after Chloromycetin 3 was marketed, reports appeared associating
its use with various blood disorders, most frequently aplastic anemia. 4 The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) continued its certification 5 only on
the condition that a warning 6 be included with the product. Parke, Davis
then sent letters to all physicians informing them of the FDA's study and
7
recommendations.
1. See cases cited note 27 infra.
2. 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973).
3. Chloromycetin is the defendant's trade name for chloramphenicol, a broad
spectrum antibiotic.
4. Aplastic anemia is a rare though serious disease causing depression or destruction of the blood forming element of bone marrow. The fatality rate exceeds 50%.
S. RE'. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kefauver Report].
5. Unless otherwise exempted, antibiotics may not be marketed without certification of the drug's safety and efficacy by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 21 U.S.C. § 357(a) (1970).
6. The label warned that serious blood dyscrasias could occur after short or longterm use and advised that "[i]t is essential that adequate blood studies be made during
treatment with the drug." 9 Cal. 3d at 56-57 n.3, 507 P.2d at 655-56 n.3, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 47 n.3.
7. These letters are easily overlooked in the great bulk of promotional mail physicians receive. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 67, 507 P.2d at 662, 107
Cal. Rptr. at 48; KEFAuVER REPORT 164.
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Parke, Davis, however, still retained considerable freedom in advertising
and promoting Chloromycetin, for prior to a 1962 amendment" to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 9 warnings were not required on advertising materials. 10 The amended Act did not compel oral warnings by drug company
salesmen, known as detail men, during their frequent promotional visits to
physicians."
Parke, Davis made maximum use of the promotional leeway given it by
the statute, both by minimizing the dangers of Chloromycetin whenever
possible' 2 and by omitting warnings when the letter of the law, if not the
health of consumers, did not require them.'8 Detail men were not instructed
by Parke, Davis to verbally inform physicians of Chloromycetin's side effects.
Moreover, the manufacturer told them to inform skeptical doctors that the
drug had "officially cleared" FDA tests and had passed three intensive in4
vestigations.1
That Parke, Davis' actions failed to impress the drug's dangers upon the
medical profession is illustrated by the conduct of Dr. Beland, the codefendant. The doctor prescribed Chloromycetin for the plaintiffs' deceased,
a 40 year old housewife, after she underwent lung surgery. Although Dr.
Beland testified that he was cognizant of the possibility that aplastic anemia
could result from either intermittent or prolonged use of Chloromycetin and
that frequent blood studies were recommended, he renewed the prescription
three times during the next six months while neglecting to test Mrs. Stevens
for blood disorders. Mrs. Stevens soon developed aplastic anemia and
died from its effects within a year.
The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against both Parke, Davis
and Dr. Beland on the grounds of negligence, strict liability in tort and
breach of implied warranty. Although the trial court granted Parke, Davis'
motion for a nonsuit on the strict liability and warranty counts, the plaintiffs
were awarded a $400,000 jury verdict against both defendants on the negligence count.15
8. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1970), amending 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1958).
9. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 et. seq. (1970).
10. Side effects must be fully stated on labels, but may be briefly summarized in
advertisements. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1970).
11. An unadopted version of the 1962 amendments would have included oral clauses
as advertisements. S. 1552, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. unreported (1961).
12. KEFAUVER REPORT 194-98.
13. Since the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not require warning in advertisements that do not include recommendations as to proper dosages and uses of the drug,
21 U.S.C. § 352(n), 21 C.F.R. § 1.105(e) (1972), Parke, Davis published "reminder"
advertisements without warnings. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 58,
507 P.2d at 656, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (1973).
14. KEFAUVER REPORT 198.
15. The plaintiffs refused a requested remittitur by the trial court and the court
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The court of appeals1 6 concluded that the evidence did not support the
verdict against Parke, Davis. Dr. Beland's admitted independent knowledge
of the drug's dangers, in the absence of evidence that he was personally
induced to prescribe Chloromycetin by the defendant's overpromotion, was
held to be an independent intervening cause of Mrs. Stevens' death.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, holding that Parke, Davis,
by "watering down" its warnings and overpromoting its product, negligently
caused physicians to prescribe Chloromycetin unnecessarily.' 7 The opinion
implied that an oral warning to physicians by Parke, Davis' detail men would
have fulfilled the duty to warn.' 8
Parke, Davis' liability was based on Section 388 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS which states that:
One who supplies. . . through a third person a chattel for another
to use is subject to liability . . . for physical harm caused by use
of the chattel. . . if the supplier ....

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition. .... 19

Even though the evidence established that the label and a printed insert
sold with the drug did contain warnings, the court noted that the jury could
find that such warning 20 was nullified by the manufacturer's overpromotion
which may have caused the prescribing physician to disregard these
warnings.
Parke, Davis' contention that Dr. Beland's negligence was an independent
intervening cause of Mrs. Stevens' death was rejected by the Supreme
Court. Whether Dr. Beland was induced to prescribe the drug because of
Parke, Davis' overpromotion, the court noted, was a question of fact for
which there was adequate circumstantial evidence to support the jury's
inference. 21 Moreover, if the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiffs' injury, the intervening negligence of a third party
granted a new trial on the issue of damages. Plaintiffs and defendants then filed
appeals.
16. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1972).
17. 9 Cal. 3d at 66, 507 P.2d at 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
18. Id.

19. Liability has been based upon § 388 in similar cases.

See, e.g., Sterling Drug,

Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378,
38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).

20. "The warnings given in this case were not so clearly effective as to defeat, as
a matter of law, the inference that they were nullified by overpromotion." 9 Cal. 3d
at 67, 507 P.2d at 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
21. The court followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) in permitting evidence of overpromotion to

the medical profession, rather than to the prescribing physician, to form the basis
upon which the jury could decide whether Parke, Davis' 0verpromotign caused Dr.
Beland to prescribe Chloromycetin.
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would not insulate the defendant from liability when the third party's
negligence was reasonably forseeable. 22 Dr. Beland's prescription of
Chloromycetin was not only reasonably forseeable, the court reasoned, but
was the "desired result" of Parke, Davis' advertising practices.
Duty To Warn
The law governing a drug manufacturer's duty to warn of side effects is
well settled. There is a "continuous duty cast upon the manufacturer of an
ethical drug to warn physicians of the dangers incident to prescribing the
drug .... -23 That duty exists even though only a small percentage of
ingesting patients will react to the drug. 24 Whether the defendant's warnings
are adequate is a question of fact and not one of law; 25 moreover, mere
compliance with applicable governmental regulations does not constitute due
care per se, for the standards set are minimal.26 At least prior to Stevens,
whether the physician's independent knowledge of the product's dangers
insulates the manufacturer from liability was a matter of disagreement
27

among courts.

Strict Liability
A manufacturer may be held liable for failing to warn of its product's
side effects on the basis of strict liability in tort. 28 Several courts have
declined to hold a drug manufacturer strictly liable on the ground that comment k, unavoidably unsafe products, to section 402 A of the RESTATEMENT
exempts prescription drugs from strict liability. 29 More probing courts,
22. See McCue v. Norwich Pharmaceutical Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970); see also
Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The manufacturer need warn only the physician, not the patient. Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F.
Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1963).
24. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
25. Love v. Wolf, note 19 supra; Incollingo v.Ewing, note 21 supra.
26. Stromsodt v. Parke, Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D. N.D. 1966), aff'd,
411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
27. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., note 23 supra [manufacturer liable]; Sterling
Drug, Inc., v. Cornish, note 24 supra [manufacturer liable]; Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D. S.D. 1967); aff'd, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969) [manufacturer liable]; Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (manufacturer not liable); Mulder v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970) (manufacturer not liable); Oppenheimer
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 219 N.E.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1964) (manufacturer not liable). For an analysis of when the physician's negligence should exempt
the manufacturer from liability see Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer'sLiability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 988-89 (1964).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
29. O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., note 27 supra; Lewis v. Baker, 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966). For a de-
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however, have correctly held that comment k does not exempt an ethical
drug manufacturer from strict liability when there has been a failure to warn
of the drug's dangers. 30 Comment k states that its exception to strict liability
applies only to products that are "accompanied by proper directions and
warning .

. . ."

Comment h notes that "[w]here . . . [the manufacturer]

has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use, as
where a drug is sold which is safe only in limited doses, [the manufacturer] may be required to give adequate warning of the danger
. . . and a product sold without such a warning is in a defective condition."

Thus an ethical drug manufacturer that overpromotes its product and
thereby nullifies its warnings is subject to strict liability for marketing a
product in a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous to the
consumer.
Furthermore, the preceeding interpretation of the applicability of Section
402 A to manufacturers of ethical drugs is reasonable in light of strict liability's well known policy basis 31 of imposing the cost of accidental injuries on
the party who can best absorb it by treating it as a cost of production.
If such policy is to be fulfilled, there cannot be a strict liability exception
merely because the manufacturer produces a socially useful product.
Social utility alters neither the plaintiff's loss nor the defendant's ability to
disperse the cost of the injury. A strict application of comment k "would
tend to eliminate the great bulk of warranty-non-negligence actions which it
32
is intended to cover."5
To uphold a verdict based on negligence, the court was forced to make
unwarranted and unnecessary inroads into negligence standards of liability.
Parke, Davis contended that the intervening acts of Dr. Beland superseded
its negligence. As heretofore stated, the court rejected this argument, noting
that the doctor's negligence was a forseeable result of Parke, Davis' acts.
A more reasonable analysis would be that the doctor's knowledge of the
dangers should relieve the original supplier from liability. 33 For if it is
forseeable that he would ignore warnings given by the FDA is it not also
fense of these cases see Cassiday, The Prescription Drug Exception To the Doctrine
of Strict Liability, 58 ILL. B.J. 268 (1969).

30. Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Toole v. Richardson-Merrel Inc.,
251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, comment c (1965).
32. Rheingold, note 27 supra at 1001 n.304; see Comment, The Manufacture, Testing
and Distribution of Harmful New Drugs: The Applicability of Strict Liability, 28 U.

PiTT. L.

REV.

37 (1966).

33. Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d at 399-400, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 196; Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. at 286, 282 A.2d at 219; see generally, W. PROSSER? THE LAw OF ToRTe
5 44 at 289 (1971).
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forseeable that he would ignore the manufacturer's warnings? If this were
so, no warning could be adequate to protect the manufacturer from liability.
The court, while wrapping its words in the cloak of negligence theory, would
thus make the manufacturer an insurer of the consumer's health-a situation
undesired by even the most ardent proponents of strict liability.
34
Questions of intervening negligence are generally matters of public policy.
Policy considerations may require that Parke, Davis be punished for its dangerous and misleading action in promoting Chloromycetin. Compensation
of innocent plaintiffs for their losses is also a primary function of
tort liability. Although the Stevens decision attempts to fulfill these twin goals
of punishment and compensation, it is inadequate because it permits a
situation in which neither goal is accomplished. The court ignores the
possibility that an unreasonably defective product may be manufactured,
promoted and sold without negligence on the part of its producer.3 5 In
this circumstance the manufacturer, though guilty of foisting a defective
product on unsuspecting consumers, will remain unpunished while the
plaintiff, though injured, will be unable to meet his burden of proof in
negligence and will therefore be uncompensated for his losses.
Had Parke, Davis been held strictly liable for its conduct, the court would
have ensured the fulfillment of these policy goals in future cases. Drug
manufacturers would be held liable for inadequate warnings of a drug's side
effects and compensation of plaintiffs would be further guaranteed by
eliminating the burden of proving the defendant's negligence, always a
formidable task in products liability litigation. Moreover, there would be
little need to strain pervailing interpretations of intervening negligence in
order to hold the manufacturer liable, for California case law holds all
parties in the product's distributive chain strictly liable.3 6
The court's decision is disappointing in still another respect-its solution
to the problem of inadequate warnings. It suggests, following a recent line
of cases,3 7 that detail men be used to convey oral warnings. Presumably,
these verbal warnings, supplemented by warning-laden literature, will discharge the manufacturer's duty to warn. If this is the court's prescription,
one might wonder if it is any freer of side effects than Chloromycetin. How
effective a verbal warning can be expected from those who have the most
34.

PRossER, note 33 supra, § 41 at 237.
35. See, e.g., Parke, Davis & Co. v. Mayes, 124 Ga. App. 224, 183 S.E.2d 410 (Ct.
App. 1971); Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1971) and cases
cited note 27 supra.
36. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1969).
37. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., note 27 supra; Love v. Wolf, note 19 supra;

Incollingo v. Ewing, note 21, supra.
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direct financial stake in continued sales of the
warning's content and adequacy will inevitably
understandable that busy physicians forget or
will it not also be understandable if they forget
tions?

drug?38 Proof of the oral
arise at trial. And if it is
overlook printed warnings,
the salesman's oral admoni-

Conclusion
Despite its shortcomings, Stevens does provide consumers with needed
protection from pharmaceutical corporations which relegate consumer safety
to a subsidiary position behind corporate profits. The court has attempted
to make clear to manufacturers the real cost of inadequate warnings, both
in terms of human life and litigation costs, by permitting a large recovery
awarded the plaintiffs to stand. Although its use of a negligence standard
of liability in place of strict liability will reduce the situations in which
injured plaintiffs will recover, Stevens nevertheless supplies a needed step
in the path to consumer protection.
Neil M. Soltman

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Judicial Power-D.C. Court Reorganization Act-D.C. Local Courts Created Under Article IJudges Exempt from Salary and Tenure Constraints of Article
III. Palmore v. U.S., 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973)

Few constitutional law issues are as confusing and unpredictable as the doctrine of "constitutional" versus "legislative" courts. When this issue was
combined with the settled principles concerning Congress' plenary power
over the District of Columbia in Palmore v. United States, the Supreme Court
had the ingredients for a crucial challenge sure to have significant theoretical and practical consequences. A bewildering opinion signals what appears
to be almost limitless justification for congressional authorization of inferior courts wholly exempt from the salary and tenure constraints imposed by
Article III of the Constitution. It portends great constitutional mischief
for the future.
38.

KEFAUVER REPORT

191.
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In January, 1971, two District of Columbia Metropolitan police officers,
while making a "spot check" of a motorist's drivers license and car rental agreement, observed a gun protruding from the front seat of a car being

driven by Roosevelt F. Palmore. They arrested the driver and later charged
him with the felony of carrying an unregistered weapon in the District after having previously sustained a felony conviction, in violation of section 223204 of the District of Columbia Code.' After a bench trial, Palmore was
found guilty by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, 2 rejecting the defendant's argument
that only a court "ordained and established" under Article III of the Constitution could try a felony prosecution arising under the laws of the United
States, albeit a law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia. Defendant appealed this issue to the Supreme Court, pursuant to the provisions
of 11 D.C. Code §1023 and 28 U.S.C. §1257(2). 4 The Supreme Court,
1. D.C. CODn ANN. § 22-3204 (1967) provides:
No person shall within the District of Columbia carry either openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, a pistol, without a license therefor
issued as hereinafter provided, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of
being so concealed. Whoever violates this section shall be punished as provided in section 22-3215, unless the violation occurs after he has been convicted in the District of Columbia of a violation of this section or of a felony,
either in the District of Columbia or in another jurisdiction, in which case he
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years.
2. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-102 (1970) provides:
"The highest court of the District of Columbia is the District of Columbia Court ot
Appeals. Final judgments and decrees of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
are reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with section
1257 of title 28, United States Code." (July 29, 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, Title I, § 111,
84 Stat. 475).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as
follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any
state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is
drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United
States.
For the purposes of this section, the term 'highest court of a State' includes
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 929; July 29, 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, § 172(a)(I),
84 Stat. 590.)
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which postponed consideration of its jurisdiction to review the case by appeal until a hearing on the merits,5 affirmed the decision, 6 treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §2103.7 In an 8 to 1 decision, the Court held that, for purposes of
appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1257(2), a statute passed by Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia is not a "statute of any State,"
making review by the Supreme Court possible only by writ of certiorari. It
further held that citizens convicted under provisions of the D.C. Code have
no right to have their cases heard by Article III judges, i.e. judges protected
by life tenure and undiminishable salary. In a fervent dissent, Justice
Douglas argued for reversal of the judgment below, asserting that the decision deprives residents of the District of "that judicial independence which
'8
helps insure fearless and evenhanded dispensation of justice."
This note will discuss how Palmore signals a marked divergence from established constitutional principles by dangerously extending the permissible scope of congressional authority to legislate for the District of Columbia.
ReorganizationAct
Palmore is the first Supreme Court case to decide the constitutionality of
the "local" court system established by the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.9 The Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, which took over the functions of the three former trial courts
(Juvenile Court, Tax Court and the Court of General Sessions), exercises criminal jurisdiction "of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively
to the District of Columbia." 10 Decisions of the local appeals court, the Dis5. 409 U.S. 840 (1972).
6. Palmore v. United States, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973).

7. 28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1962) provides:
If an appeal to the Supreme Court is improvidently taken from the decision of the highest court of a State, or of a United States court of appeals, in
a case where the proper mode of review is by petition for certiorari, this
alone shall not be ground for dismissal; but the papers whereon the appeal

was taken shall be regarded and acted on as a petition for writ of certiorari
and as if duly presented to the Supreme Court at the time the appeal was

taken. Where in such case there appears to be no reasonable ground for
granting a petition for writ of certiorari it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to adjudge to the respondent reasonable damages for his delay,
and single or double costs. (Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-669, § 1, 76 Stat.
556).
8. 36 L. Ed. 2d at 364.
9. 84 Stat. 473. For congressional background materials on the Act, see H.R.

REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-923(b)(1) (1970). The only instance in which the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia exercises jurisdiction over local criminal laws is when a local offense "is joined in the same information or indictment
with any Federal offense."

D.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 11-502(3) (1970).
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trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, are no longer subject to review by the
United States Court of Appeals, but are directly reviewable by the Supreme
Court "in accordance with section 1257 of title 28, U.S.C." 11 Furthermore, the enumeration of courts which are vested with "judicial power" by
Congress as set forth in the Act includes the Superior Court, unlike the former
enumeration in the 1967 D.C. Code.
The Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals are
said to have been established pursuant to Article I of the Constitution,
whereas the Supreme Court and the federal trial and appellate tribunals in
the District of Columbia were established pursuant to Article 111.12 All judges
of the local courts are appointed by the President for 15 year terms (subject
to mandatory retirement at age 70), are subject to removal by the newlycreated District of Columbia Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure,
and are not given statutory or constitutional protection against diminution
in their salaries.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 sets forth the circumstances by which the Supreme Court
may review final judgments rendered by the highest court of a state. The
Reorganization Act' provides that for purposes of § 1257, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals is to be considered the "highest court of a State."
Therefore, in the matter sub judice, a right of appeal would lie to the Supreme Court only if the provision of the D.C. Code under which the appellant
' 4
was convicted were to be considered "a statute of any state.'
At first glance, congressional investiture of "judicial power" in non-Article III courts seems to be expressly forbidden by the Constitution which, in
Article III, § 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
Article I, § 8, cl. 9 provides, "The Congress shall have Power: To constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;"
The question immediately arises: May Congress constitutionally vest "judicial power" in courts (here, the Superior Court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals) not "ordained and established" under Article III of the
11. D.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 11-102 (1970).

12. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-101 (1970).

13. § 172(a)(1), 84 Stat. 590, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
14. See note 4 supra.
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Constitution as it purports to do in the Reorganization Act?15 If so, may it
create non-Article III courts which are not subject to the salary and tenure
constraints of Article III merely by designating the District Clause of Article I as its source of power rather than Article II1?16
"Constitutional"versus "Legislative" Courts
A long line of decisions by the Supreme Court spanning the nation's history
has established a curious distinction between "constitutional" and "legislative" courts. The distinction has produced not only much confusion
and controversy, but also a constant parley between the Court and Congress as
to the authority by which Congress has established inferior courts. 17 The
term "legislative court," coined by Chief Justice Marshall in American Insurance Co. v. Canter,'8 defines that category of inferior courts established by
Congress pursuant to any of its non-Article III powers throughout the Constitution. Whether these legislative courts may exercise the judicial power
of Article IlI or "another species of judicial power wholly separate and
apart from [Congress'] authority under Article III to confer judicial power
on inferior federal courts"' 19 is the crux of Palmore.
Canter held that legislative courts (in that case, Florida territorial courts
created by the territorial legislature) are "incapable" of exercising the judicial power of the United States as defined in Article IlI:
They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that
15. For the argument that article III "is the complete catalog of federal judicial
power," see 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.4[4], at 71 (2d ed. 1953).

16. For arguments in the negative, see Note, The Distinction Between Legislative

and Constitutional Courts and Its Effect on Judicial Assignment, 62 COL. L. REv. 133

(1962) (hereinafter cited as 62 COL. L. REv.) and National Mutual Insurance Co. v.

Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 605 (1949)
curring).

(Rutledge and Murphy, J.J., con-

17. For example, in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) and Williams
v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933), the Supreme Court held the Court of Customs
Appeals (now the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) and the U.S. Court of Claims
to be legislative courts, respectively. Subsequently, Congress, by Act of August 25, 1958,

§ 1, 70 Stat. 848, declared the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals a constitutional
court; by Act of July 28, 1953, § 1, 67 Stat. 226, declared the Court of Claims to be a

constitutional court, and; by Act of July 14, 1956, § 1, 70 Stat. 532, declared the
Customs Court a constitutional court. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962),
the Supreme Court, by a three-member majority, overruled Bakelite and Williams,
holding both courts to be created pursuant to article III and ruling that their judges

could validly serve in U.S. Courts of Appeals or U.S. District Courts under 28 U.S.C.

§ 293(a). For critical comment, see Note, Legislative and Constitutional Courts:
What Lurks Ahead for Bifurcation, 71 YALE L. J. 979 (1962) and Watson, The
Concept of the Legislative Court: A Constitutional Fiction, 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
799 (1942).

18. 1Pet. 511 (1828).
19. Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d at 577.
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clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not part of
that judicial power which is defined in the third article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those
general powers which that body possesses over the territory of the
U.S. 20
Canter thus opened a Pandora's Box of litigation by which the Supreme
Court has sanctioned Congress' creation of inferior federal courts whose classification has depended upon judicial interpretation of the power which Con21
gress used to create them.
The District Clause
Three well-settled principles established by the Supreme Court regarding
Congress' plenary power "[T]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all cases
whatsoever, over such District.

.

. as may.

. .

become the Seat of the Gov-

ernment of the United States . . .22 which had direct bearing on Palmore
are the following:
1. Congress' rule-making power over the District of Columbia is
subject23to the constraints of the Constitution and its amendments.

2. Congress possesses "dual authority" over the District-that of
the federal government and a state legislature-and may,
therefore, "clothe the courts of the District not only with the
jurisdiction and powers of Federal courts in the several states,
'2 4
but with such authority as a state may confer on her courts."
3. Congress has authority to confer legislative or administrative
powers upon the constitutional (federal) courts of the District 25which it may not vest in federal courts outside the District.
The intersection of these three principles was presented to the Supreme
20. 1 Pet. at 546.
21. See generally, 1 J. MOORE, FEDEaAL PRACTICE f 0.4[1], (2d ed. 1953) passim.
22. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
23. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953); O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 545 (1933); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 260-61
(1901); and Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 550 (1888). See also Act of Feb. 21, 1871,
c. 62, 16 Stat. 419, 426, § 34 which specifically extended the Constitution and the laws
of the United States to the District of Columbia.
24. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 619 (1838). See also, Stoutenburgh v.
Hennick, 129 U.S. 141, 147 (1889); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5 (1899);
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1923); and Postum Cereal
Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 700 (1927). For a discussion of the
"hybrid" category of federal courts in the District which have qualities of both constitutional and legislative courts, see 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE at 0.4[4].
25. Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884); Baldwin v. Howard Co., 256 U.S. 35
(1921).
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Court in O'Donoghue v. U.S. 26 Pursuant to a ruling by the Controller General under the Legislative Appropriation Act, 27 the disbursing officer of the
Department of Justice reduced the annual compensation of two District of
Columbia federal judges. The judges brought suit in the Court of Claims to
recover the deductions made, and the Supreme Court, on certificates from the
Court of Claims, examined (1) the applicability of Article III, § 1 of the
Constitution to the federal courts in the District and (2) the lawfulness of
Congress' attempt to diminish their salaries. Distinguishing the special reasons for Congress' authorization of judges with limited tenure in the "outlying territories" from the peculiarly vulnerable status of courts in the District,
the Court held that both the then Supreme Court of D.C. and the United
States Court of Appeals are Article III courts whose judges hold office during
good behavior and whose salaries may not be diminished during their continuance in office.
• . . [T]he reasons . . . which impelled the adoption of the constitutional limitation, apply with even greater 'force to the courts
of the District than to the inferior courts of the U.S. located elsewhere, because the judges of the former courts are in closer contact with, and more immediately open to the influences of, the
legislative department .... 28
The O'Donoghue Court, citing the dual authority Congress exercises over
the District, added:
The two powers are not incompatible; and we perceive no reason
for holding that the plenary power given by the District clause of
the Constitution may be used to destroy the operative effect of the
judicial clause within the District, where, unlike the territories
occupying a9 different status, that clause is entirely appropriateand
2
applicable.
Is There More Than One Source of JudicialPower?
In Palmore, the Court held that, O'Donoghue notwithstanding,3 0 Congress lawfully exercised its dual authority over the District of Columbia when it
26. 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
27. § 107(a)(5), 47 Stat. 402 (1932). The section reduced "the salaries and retired
pay of all judges (except judges whose compensation may not, under the Constitution, be diminished during their continuance in office)."

The salaries of an associ-

ate justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (predecessor to the
U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia) and an associate justice of the U.S.
Court of Appeals were subsequently reduced.
28. 289 U.S. at 535.
29. Id. at 546 [emphasis added].
30. The Court held O'Donoghue was not controlling since it involved courts in
which the disposition of local matters was incidental, a distinction that, at least arguably, did not have to be made. See Brief for Appellant at 30-31 n.3, Palmore v.
United States, 36 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1973).
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created a local court system staffed with judges of limited tenure. Its
argument rested heavily upon the fact that, for nearly 100 years after the
Constitution was ratified, state courts having judges with only limited tenure
were the sole forum for federal question jurisdiction and for hearing cases
involving selected federal criminal laws. The Court cited Congress' lawful
exercise of its Article IV power to regulate the territories and its Article I,
§ 8, cl. 14 power to regulate the land and naval forces in creating territorial courts and courts-martial whose judges regularly try criminal cases but
are not afforded salary and tenure protection. Without specifying the
source of the "judicial power" conferred on the Superior Court, the Court
said:
It was under the judicial power conferred on the Superior Court by
the 1970 Reorganization Act that Palmore was convicted for violation of § 22-3204 of the District of Columbia Code (1967). The
conviction was clearly within the authority granted Congress by Article I, § 8, cl. 17 .... 81
And without deisgnating what "proper circumstances" necessitate or
justify congressional exemption of local courts in the District from salary and
tenure protection, the Court held:
• . . [T]he requirements of Article III . . . must in proper cirstances give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.8 2
Conclusion
Several commentators presaged the predictable quandary the Court would be
in when faced with appeal of a felony conviction under the D.C. Code by
an Article I court.8 8 At least insofar as serious felony prosecutions were
involved, as in Palmore, many agreed that the judiciary needed particularly
effective measures to insure their insulation from the political or ideological
pressures which might come to bear on them. 4 A timely comment on
the local court system established by the Reorganization Act observed:
31. 36 L. Ed. 2d at 352.
32. Id. at 357-58.
33. For an incisive look at the options which were to face the Court in National
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (the case
which was to decide the propriety of Congress' granting to citizens of the District of
Columbia the right to sue in any federal court on diversity grounds) see Rathvon &
Keeffe, Washingtoniansand Roumanians, 27 NEB. L. Rv. 375 (1948).
34. "The general reasons for article III guarantees seem applicable with special
force to serious criminal prosecutions, whether under laws of national scope or under
local enactments. There appear to be no practical reasons, such as exist for courts
dealing with minor civil and criminal matters, for not applying article III to bodies
trying such cases." 62 COL. L. REv., 154 n.149. See also Brown, The Rent in Our
ludicial Armor, 10 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 127 (1941).
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If it actually is "judicial Power" that is being vested in the District's legislative courts, the question persists as to whether Congress in its capacity as a legislature for the District, may ignore
any or all of the constraints imposed by the Constitution, especially
those in article III covering tenure and salary. Inasmuch as the
competence of the new local court system extends to grave criminal offenses, it becomes of vital interest whether the attributes of
guaranteed by article III are inviolable,
judicial independence
5
personal rightsA.
Though there is little if any practical difference to individual litigants
resulting from the Court's determination that it may review convictions under
the D.C. Code only on petition for ceritiorari, 36 certainly the Court's broadening of congressional authority to create non-Article III courts exempt from
tenure and salary constraints will seriously disturb advocates of constitutional orthodoxy. Nowhere in the Constitution is there any indication that, as
O'Donoghue said, Congress' plenary power over the District "may be used to
destroy the operative effect of the judicial clause in the District, 137 but this
seems to be exactly what the Court has permitted. More importantly, however, the mischievous business which Chief Justice Marshall began in Canter
when he sanctioned the chipping away of the constitutional provisions designed to guarantee judicial independence has been dredged up again and
given new life. Where will it end? Is the limitation imposed on the federal judiciary no limitation at all when Congress provides any meager excuse for exempting courts of its creation? If eight justices of the Supreme
Court are satisfied with having a real estate appraiser and an undertaker
sitting in judgment on the conduct of judges in the federal segment of our
nation, what other constitutional protections will be nullified whenever
38
Congress recites its litany of powers?
35. Williams, District of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEO. L. J. 477,

491-92 (1971).
36. Insofar as summary affirmances have precedential value which denials of
certiorari do not, Palmore may limit the effect of Supreme Court rulings on D.C.C.A.
cases. See STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, at 326-27 (4th ed. 1969).

37. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
38. An analogous situation in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) where the Court
struck down a congressional attempt to expose civilians to trials by military courtsmartial is worth recalling. There, the Government urged that the Necessary and
Proper Clause when read together with Congress' art. I, § 3, cl.14 power to regulate
the land and naval forces, authorized Congress to subject civilian wives of American
officers to courts-martial. Justice Black said:
It is true that the Constitution expressly grants Congress power to make all
rules necessary and proper to govern and regulate those persons who are

serving in the 'land and naval forces'. But the Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot operate to extend military jurisdiction to any group of persons beyond
that class described in Clause 14-'the land and naval Forces' . . .

Every

extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of

the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury
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Had the Supreme Court in Palmore indicated by what metaphysical leap
Congress has created its new source of "judicial power" or had it justified its reasons for allowing Congress to step on the independence of the judiciary in the District,8 9 its holding might have been more enlightening. Congress now has an unexpected and forthright basis by which to justify its almost limitless power to create inferior federal courts with judges exempt
from those constitutional guarantees of independence which the Founding
Fathers cherished. And by some mysterious form of judicial alchemy, the
Supreme Court has re-opened a dangerous breach in the "bulwark" of our
constitutional protections.
Roslyn A. Mazer

trial and of other treasured constitutional protections. Having run up against
the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot extend the scope of Clause 14.
354 U.S. at 20-21. See also Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
39. 'The ideals of Article M and the Bill of Rights provide the mucilage which
holds majorities and minorities together in the federal segment of our Nation, and
make tolerable the existence of non-conformists who do not walk to the measure of the
beat of the Chief Drummer. . . . No federal court exercising Art. M judicial
power should be made a minion of any cabal that from accidents of politics comes
into the ascendancy as an overlord of the District of Columbia. That effort unhappily
succeeds today and is in disregard of one of our most cherished constitutional provisions." 36 L. Ed. 2d at 364 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

